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The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 19841
(the Act), the first major federal drug legislation enacted by Congress since
1962, has been extolled by some observers as creating many winners but no
losers. The Act simplifies the federal drug approval process for generic cop-
ies of brand-name pharmaceuticals, and attempts to stimulate pharmaceuti-
cal research and development by guaranteeing market exclusivity to
innovative drug products. Consumer savings from the greater availability of
generic drugs that may be generated by the Act have been predicted at one
billion dollars during the next decade,2 and the Act's market exclusivity and
patent term extension provisions are designed to encourage pharmaceutical
innovation.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act is an out-
growth of demands for legislative relief by two segments of the pharmaceuti-
cal industry: the marketers of brand-name and generic drugs.3 Many
1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2647, 2650 ($920 million saved in next 12 years from generic copies of
drugs first approved after 1962); Kushner, More RPh's Choose Generics,- Long and Short- Term
Data Show Trend Gaining Strength, AM. DRUGGIST, Oct. 1984, at 23 (one billion dollars in
savings from Act); Prescription for Cheap Drugs, TIME, Sept. 17, 1984, at 64 (one billion dollar
potential savings over next 12 years).
3. For ease of reading, this article labels companies that produce generic drugs as "ge-
neric" or "production-intensive" firms, and those responsible for pioneer drugs as "brand-
name" or "research-intensive" companies. This terminology is not meant to ignore the trend
to production of generic copies of brand-name drugs by traditionally research-intensive firms.
These so called "branded generics" will be increasingly important as the market for generic
copies of high dollar-volume drug products expands during the next several years.
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brand-name drug manufacturers develop pioneer drug products and rely on
the market exclusivity guaranteed by patents to assure returns on their in-
vestments in innovation. The development and marketing of drugs in the
United States are governed by the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
which is administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and
drug products sold in the United States often undergo a lengthy process of
securing FDA approval prior to marketing. For years, the brand-name
pharmaceutical industry lobbied Congress to enact patent extension legisla-
tion, claiming that the lengthy drug approval process had eroded the effec-
tive patent protection for new drug products far below the seventeen-year
grant contemplated by the federal patent statute. Representatives of generic
drug producers and consumer groups, however, uniformly opposed patent
term restoration.
Similarly, the generic segment of the drug industry asserted that the FDA
drug approval process, by forcing generic equivalents of already-approved
pioneer drugs to undergo or reproduce the tests conducted for pioneer prod-
ucts, unfairly delayed drug price competition. Generic firms, as well as
many consumer groups, sought congressional relief from the FDA's failure
to simplify the approval process for generic copies of already-approved
drugs. Without patent term restoration, however, brand-name manufactur-
ers were unwilling to endorse changes that would permit generic drugs to
compete more readily with their pioneer products.
In 1984, Congress enacted legislation that combined the legislative priori-
ties of the competing industry groups. The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act enables manufacturers of generic drug prod-
ucts to submit their products for approval under an abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) procedure. The Act also amends the patent statute to
permit the use of a patented drug product in the preparation of tests required
by the FDA. The Act addresses the concerns of research-intensive pharma-
ceutical firms by creating market exclusivity periods for various classes of
new drug products and by authorizing patent extensions of up to five years
for pharmaceuticals whose remaining exclusive marketing life after FDA ap-
proval is less than fourteen years.
Although the Act is likely to affect both the quality and cost of drug ther-
apy, the enthusiasm exhibited by its supporters may not be fully justified.4
4. See supra note 2. When he signed the Act in September 1984, President Reagan de-
clared that the Act "will save [consumers] more than a billion dollars over the next 10 years
. . . and promote medical breakthroughs and drug innovation." President's Remarks on Sign-
ing the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 20 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1359, 1359 (Sept. 24, 1984). This glowing outlook has not been adopted by all
commentators. See The Price for More Generic Drugs, 224 SCd. 369, 369 (1984) (quoting Wil-
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The Act's benefits to consumers, generic drug manufacturers, and brand-
name drug companies will not accrue simultaneously. As generic manufac-
turers seek to enter the market, the provisions of the Act that ease the ap-
proval of generic drugs will have an immediate effect; the exclusivity and
patent extension provisions that are intended to benefit brand-name manu-
facturers, on the other hand, apply only to products approved by the FDA
after January 1, 1982. The Act's market exclusivity periods may stimulate
pharmaceutical research and development, but even if this occurs, the bene-
fits of increased innovation will be experienced in the future, and the costs of
market exclusivity will be similarly delayed.
The benefits of generic competition, by contrast, will materialize sooner,
but will eventually be subject to the offsetting costs of market exclusivity for
products for which generic competition will be forestalled. Because even
without the changes created by the Act the patents on many new drug prod-
ucts would not have expired for several years, the full effect of patent exten-
sion and market exclusivity on the future generic market will not be seen
until late in this decade or early in the next. Similarly, the anticipated fruits
of the parallel stimuli to research and development in the Act will not reach
the market before the end of the 1980's. This lag between the early benefits
and later costs of the Act has caused skeptics to allege that the Act ex-
changes a short-term benefit to competition for a long-term cost to
consumers.
This article critiques the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Resto-
ration Act of 1984. Part I traces the background of the two major sections
of the Act by examining the recent trend toward generic competition in the
pharmaceutical industry and the need perceived by some industry observers
for additional incentives to pharmaceutical research. Part II of the article
describes and discusses the sections of the Act designed to benefit the two
segments of the pharmaceutical industry. Part III addresses the likely effect
of the Act on generic competition, and Part IV provides a parallel analysis
for the research-intensive pharmaceutical firms. The article offers several
suggestions for legislative and administrative initiatives that would
strengthen the Act and further its twin goals of generic price competition
and adequate incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.
liam Schultz, Public Litigation Group); National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs., News Bulle-
tin, Oct. 1984, at 5 (Act "mortgage[s] the future for the consumer for a short-term gain"
(analysis of Milton M. Bass, NAPM general counsel)); M. Bass, Speech at Regulatory Affairs
Professional Society Conference, Perspectives on ANDA/PTR Bill (Sept. 13-14, 1984) (exclu-
sivity provisions of Act will be "dominant factor in drug competition through the beginning of
the next century" (quoting Pink Sheet)).
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I. GENESIS OF THE ACT
A. The Movement to Generic Drugs
During the past half-century, pharmaceutical marketing in the United
States evolved from a system in which pharmaceutical companies supplied
bulk chemicals to pharmacists who compounded and sold prescription drugs
to one in which the pharmaceutical industry produces finished products and
some companies invest in development of new drug therapies.5 Patent pro-
tection and product differentiation became increasingly important to the in-
novators of new drugs.6 The emergence of counterfeit drug products and the
willingness of some pharmacists to substitute counterfeit or duplicate drug
products for prescribed brand-name drugs led the industry to press for the
enactment of state statutes prohibiting pharmacists from substituting for a
brand-name product prescribed by a physician.' South Dakota regulators
promulgated an antisubstitution rule in 1955, and by 1972 antisubstitution
statutes or regulations existed in almost every state.' Most of these state
laws required that pharmacists dispense the exact product specified by the
prescriber; thus, pharmacists were free to fill prescriptions with generic
products only if the prescription was written with the product's generic
name, rather than with a brand name.
This restriction on the growth of the generic drug market generated con-
sumer and industry pressure that caused a shift in the legislative attitude
toward product substitution by pharmacists. By the late 1970's, antisubsti-
tution laws had been repealed or amended in every jurisdiction,9 and by mid-
1984, every state had enacted a generic substitution law. t° The new laws
allow pharmacists to substitute equivalent generic products unless the pre-
scribing doctor signs a line on the prescription that indicates his unwilling-
ness to permit substitution, or unless he writes out a phrase such as
"Dispense As Written" or "Do Not Substitute." Substitution is limited by
state formularies that either designate drug products that are equivalent
5. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, DRUG PRODUCT
SELECTION 15-17 (1979).
6. Id. at 16-17.
7. Id. at 143-51. Because of the enactment of antisubstitution legislation, brand-name
manufacturers could insulate their market share by creating brand-name recall in physicians
and pharmacists, who would tend to prescribe and dispense brand-name drug products.
8. Id. at 149-50.
9. See Prescription for Cheap Drugs, supra note 2, at 65; COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, PROGRAMS TO CONTROL PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS UNDER MEDI-
CAID AND MEDICARE COULD BE STRENGTHENED 40-47, 51-54 (1980).
10. A. MASSON & R. STEINER, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS I (1985) (Staff
Report of the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Comm'n).
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(positive formularies) or products that are not interchangeable (negative
formularies). "
The generic pharmaceutical market has also been spurred by the ability of
competing pharmacies to advertise the availability of generic drugs 2 and by
cost-control pressures imposed by private and federal medical reimburse-
ment programs.' 3 The future for generic drugs is bright: by 1988 drug
products that accounted in 1984 for over four billion dollars in annual sales
will have gone off patent.14 In its 1979 report on drug product selection, the
Federal Trade Commission described the maximum potential savings from
substitution of generic copies for brand-name products as $400 to $500 mil-
lion per year.' 5 The predicted boom in the generic market has led many
11. The FDA has provided a source for the compilation of state formularies by publishing
a list that contains approved drug products and evaluations of therapeutic equivalence. See 45
Fed. Reg. 72,582 (1980) (authorizing release of evaluations of equivalence); see also 21 C.F.R.
§ 20.117(a)(3) (1985) (list with therapeutic equivalence evaluations available from FDA).
A recent study concludes, rather suprisingly, that the existence of any formulary, positive or
negative, discourages substitution, see A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 98-99, and
that positive formularies are associated with fewer substitutions than negative formularies. Id.
at 71-72, 99. But see Zeich, One-line Rx Forms Boost Drug Substitution, DRUG Topics, Jan.
17, 1984, at 37-38 (finding opposite result); infra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (advo-
cating a national positive formulary).
12. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the advertising of prescription drug prices is
protected commercial speech.
To the extent that consumers will choose between pharmacies on the basis of differences in
prescription costs, interpharmacy competition will lead to greater substitution of generic
drugs. A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 35-36. In particular, large drug store
chains should experience economies of scale in inventory selection and advertising, although
one study has shown no significant variations in substitution rates among chain and independ-
ent pharmacies. Id. at 57-59, 60. Another study found no increase in generic prescribing,
despite competition among pharmacies, for prescriptions on which a brand-name product was
prescribed. Kralewski, Pitt & Dowd, The Effects of Competition on Prescription-Drug-Product
Substitution, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 213, 215 (1983).
13. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 44-45; see also infra notes
250-61 and accompanying text.
14. See Mabon, Nugent & Co., Generic Drug Industry Monitor No. 6: Summary and
Analysis of "The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984," 3 (Oct.
11, 1984) (investment newsletter). One author estimated that the share of the entire market
accounted for by patented drugs would be only 55% by the end of 1985. P. TEMIN, TAKING
YOUR MEDICINE 152 (1980).
15. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 196. A recently released Fed-
eral Trade Commission study provides a more detailed empirical analysis of the potential sav-
ings from generic substitution. The study evaluated 1980 data from 48 states and the District
of Columbia on prescriptions for 45 multisource drug entities. A. MASSON & R. STEINER,
supra note 10, at 7-8. The study showed that cost savings from generic substitution were
between $44 and $80 million in 1980, but more than doubled to $130-236 million by 1984. Id.
at 30-31, 178-80. In 1980, the rate of substitution by pharmacists was 5.5%, id. at 9, and that
statistic escalated to 9.5% in 1984. Id. at 19-20. Moreover, the study authors acknowledged
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stock analysts to advise investment in generic firms. 16 In spite of the per-
ceived potential market for generic pharmaceuticals, however, the actual rate
of generic substitution for brand-name products has grown slowly. Recent
studies of generic drug usage show that brand-name products continue to
control at least eighty percent of the total market for prescription drugs.'7
Three factors constrained sales of generics before the Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act. First, the FDA's drug approval pro-
cess for generic drugs made it expensive to enter the market with generic
copies of some already-approved pioneer drugs. Second, physicians and
pharmacists remain reluctant to prescribe or dispense generic drugs. Fi-
nally, a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit created a new stumbling block by preventing potential competitors
from conducting the tests necessary to secure FDA approval of generic cop-
ies of branded products. This section of the article considers each of these
three impediments.
1. Generics in the Drug Approval Process
In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to
require that new drugs be proved not only safe, as the Act originally re-
quired, but also "effective." Drugs approved prior to the 1962 Amendments
were reevaluated for efficacy in the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation
(DESI) program. As part of its review of the efficacy of pre-1962 drugs, the
FDA formulated an abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) procedure
under which generic copies of effective pre-1962 drugs could gain approval if
shown to be pharmacologically equivalent (bioequivalent) to the pioneer.' 8
The FDA failed (or refused), however, to implement a similar ANDA
procedure for generic copies of drug products first approved after 1962. For
the understated character of their results as predictors of substitution after enactment of the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Id. at 9.
It is worth observing here that savings from substitution are not a pure economic gain for
society. Most of the cost savings to consumers, and the increased revenues of generic drug
producers, represent wealth transfers from brand-name manufacturers. BUREAU OF CON-
SUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 301; A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 15.
16. See, e.g., A. G. Becker Paribas, Inc., Industry Review: Generic Drug Industry (Apr. 6
1984) (investment newsletter).
17. See, e.g., Goldberg, Aldridge, DeVito, Vidis, Moore & Dickson, Impact of Drug Sub-
stitution Legislation: A Report of the First Year's Experience, 17 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL A.
(n.s.) 216, 219 (1977) (almost 19% of prescriptions written generically, but some generically
written prescriptions filled with brand-name products); Stewart, Grussing & Purohit, Drug
Product Selection in Illinois. The First Year's Experience, 20 MED. CARE 831, 836 (1982)
(12.6% substitution rate in Illinois).
18. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.56 (1985) (ANDAs permitted for drug products covered by Drug
Efficacy Study).
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some time it insisted that each application for the approval of a generic drug
must be supported by test data of the same quantity and scope that a full
New Drug Application (NDA) for a pioneer drug would contain. This
agency policy was strengthened by the Supreme Court's 1983 holding in
United States v. Generix Drug Corp. '9 that a generic copy of an already-
approved drug is still a "new drug" within the meaning of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. The FDA could therefore require that each generic
product be individually approved on the basis of a full NDA.
Even before Generix, however, the FDA had retreated from its position
that a full NDA was necessary for generic copies of approved drugs. The
agency concluded that its interest in proven safety and efficacy would be met
with a "paper NDA" procedure for approval of generic products.2 ° The
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requires that new drug applications contain
"full reports of investigations" demonstrating safety and effectiveness,2 ' and
according to the FDA, this requirement could be met by an NDA that relied
on published reports of studies sufficient to prove safety and efficacy.22
The paper NDA procedure did not significantly reduce the cost of gaining
approval for generic drugs. Many of the essential studies of a pioneer prod-
uct's safety and efficacy are sponsored or conducted by the company that
holds the drug's patent, and the FDA has concurred in the brand-name drug
industry's claim that the reports of such studies, even after submission to the
FDA, should receive trade secret protection.23 Without access to these stud-
ies, potential marketers of generic copies could not cite published studies
sufficient to demostrate safety and efficacy.
Consumer groups and generic producers continued to lobby both the
FDA and Congress for a procedure that would make approval of generic
drugs easier. The ANDA provisions contained in the Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act purported to answer that demand,
but they were not uncontroversial. Under the Act, a manufacturer may se-
cure FDA approval of a generic copy of an approved drug by showing that
the generic product contains the identical active ingredients as, and is bioe-
19. 460 U.S. 453 (1983).
20. See 45 Fed. Reg. 85,052 (1980) (FDA notice defending paper NDA procedure). For
descriptions of the controversy surrounding implementation of the paper NDA policy, see
Competition in the Drug Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter
cited as 1981 House Competition Hearing].
21. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
22. See 45 Fed. Reg. 85,052 (1980) (FDA notice defending paper NDA procedure).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2647, 2668-69; 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(f) (1985) (safety and effectiveness
data only released under certain circumstances).
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quivalent to and bioavailable with, the original drug.24 One possible objec-
tion to an ANDA process is an argument traditionally made by brand-name
manufacturers-that the lower price of generic pharmaceuticals is partly a
reflection of quality and reputational differences between brand-name and
generic drugs.25 Yet no recent studies have revealed that generic drugs are
inferior, 26 and the FDA applies the same manufacturing standards to brand-
name and generic firms.27
Bioequivalency and bioavailability are also carefully regulated by the
FDA. Two drugs are bioequivalent when they contain the same amount of
the identical active ingredient and are bioavailable. Drugs are bioavailable
when they have the same rate and extent of absorption. 2s FDA regulations
assure that approved generic products will have been adequately tested for
bioequivalency and bioavailability. 29 In many states, pharmacists and physi-
cians are informed of bioequivalent drug therapies through formularies.30 In
New York, for example, a positive formulary lists 800 drugs deemed by the
FDA to have therapeutic equivalents.3'
24. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
25. See J. EGAN, H. HIGINBOTHAM & J. WESTON, ECONOMICS OF THE PHARMACEUTI-
CAL INDUSTRY 51 (1982); M. STATMAN, COMPETITION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUS-
TRY 53 (1981); see also D. SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 247 (1976) (drug quality is positively correlated to firm size).
26. See D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 25, at 226-34 (citing several studies demonstrating
inferior drug quality, but none after 1971).
27. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 210, 211 (1985) (good manufacturing practices for drugs); id. § 320
(bioequivalence and bioavailability requirements); Hecht, Generic Drugs: How Good Are
They? FDA CONS., Feb. 1978, at 17-18; see also BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra
note 5, at 250-51 (FDA enforces product quality standards). But see D. SCHWARTZMAN,
supra note 25, at 234-35, 247 (FDA needs better inspection procedures for generic
manufacturers).
28. 21 C.F.R. § 320.1 (1985). Drugs with the same active ingredient will usually contain
different non-active ingredients. A product's mix of active and non-active ingredients is pro-
tected as a trade secret, but may vary the biological effect of the drug. See id. § 314.430(g)
(1985). Bioequivalence and bioavailability regulations therefore require that drugs with the
same active ingredient be tested to assure that their mix of inactive ingredients does not alter
bioavailability.
29. See id. § 320 (bioequivalence and bioavailability regulations); BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 124-28; Hecht, supra note 27, at 18-20; Kushner, supra note 2,
at 55 (noting increased FDA and HHS involvement in assessing bioequivalency). But see
PMA NEWSLETTER, Dec. 23, 1985, at 3-4 (physician group has asked FDA to revamp its
bioequivalency regulations).
30. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 9, at 41-44 (table
listing types of formularies established by states).
31. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 160; FDA CONS., Feb.
1978, at 19 (FDA has endorsed New York formulary).
The Federal Trade Commission advocates a Model Drug Product Selection Act that would
require the FDA to establish a nationwide positive formulary. See Model Drug Product Selec-
tion Act, § 5A, reprinted in BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 281-83.
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Thus, until the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, the absence of a simple procedure for the approval by the FDA of ge-
neric drugs constituted a major barrier to an increase in the share of the
market held by generics. Even without that impediment, however, other ob-
stacles to the widespread acceptance of generics could be found in the preva-
lent attitudes of pharmacists and physicians.
2. Generics in the Market
Prescription drugs are unique among consumer products in that the pur-
chaser of a drug has no practical market power to select among alternative
products.32 Authority over prescribing and dispensing decisions rests with
the physician and pharmacist, respectively. The incentives that affect the
decisions made by these professionals, however, are not necessarily identical
to those that would guide a product selection by the consumer.
a. Physician Prescribing Habits
Most prescription drugs have three names: a chemical name describing
the chemical structure of the drug's active ingredient, a generic name that
represents an abbreviated version of the chemical name of the active ingredi-
ent, and any brand name given to the finished drug product by its manufac-
turer.33 The generic name is the "official" 34 name of a product used in
scientific and medical literature and by manufacturers that do not give their
product a trade name.3 5 Brand names are established in order to permit
manufacturers to distinguish their version of a drug containing a particular
active ingredient from other equivalent products. Most physicians still write
prescriptions using the brand name of a drug. 36 This reliance on brand
names has three bases.
First, the pharmaceutical market emphasizes, through print advertising
and direct promotion by manufacturer representatives, the brand-name
products of various drug producers. Although drug product advertising
serves an informational function by generating knowledge about alternative
therapies, a primary purpose of most pharmaceutical promotion is the crea-
32. See Jadlow, Competition and "Quality" in the Drug Industry: The 1962 Kefauver-
Harris Drug Amendments as Barriers to Entry, ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV., Winter 197 1-
1972, at 103, 105.
33. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 26-27.
34. Generic names are officially assigned by the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
who may designate a name assigned to the drug in an official compendium such as the United
States Pharmacopoeia. See 21 U.S.C. § 358 (1982).
35. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 27.
36. See A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 6 (physicians specify brand name in
79.9% of prescriptions).
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tion of "brand-name recall" in physicians.37 Because generic names are
tongue twisters and brand names are deliberately easy to remember, 38 physi-
cians exhibit a preference for brand-name products learned about through
sales promotion. 39 To some extent, then, the use of brand names by physi-
cians is more a result of habit, encouraged by brand-name manufacturers,
than an indicated preference for brand-name drugs.'
Second, physicians are typically unaware of the differential between retail
prices of brand-name and generic drugs.41 Patients do not choose among
equivalent products by price, but are limited to the product selection made
by their physician. Few patients will change physicians merely because
their doctor prescribes more expensive drugs, and physicians therefore have
little incentive to take advantage of available price information.42 Nor will
advertising of generic drugs force awareness of the comparative cost of
equivalent drugs: generic companies often advertise product lines, but have
infrequently promoted individual products.43
Third, although FDA's quality controls for drug production apply to all
manufacturers, brand-name drug companies use advertising and direct pro-
motion to create and reinforce the perception that generic drugs are qualita-
tively inferior to their brand-name counterparts. The obvious incentive to
suggest inferiority manifests itself in a variety of negative advertising tech-
niques. One brand-name company recently hired a pharmacy professor to
preach the hazards of generic drugs at medical meetings." Print advertising
in medical journals often contains slogans that emphasize the superior qual-
37. See Leffler, Persuasion or Information?: The Economics of Prescription Drug Advertis-
ing, 24 J.L. & ECON. 45, 47 (1981).
38. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 31.
39. Id. at 5-6.
40. See id. at 63-64.
41. See id. at 64-65.
42. Id. at 3. Although the Department of Health and Human Services collects and pub-
lishes comparative price data for bioequivalent drug products, physicians rarely rely on this
sort of market information. See P. TEMIN, supra note 14, at 103-05; Zelnio, Physician's Use of
the Guide to Prescription Drug Costs: An Exploration, 16 DRUG INTELLIGENCE & CLINICAL
PHARMACY 874 (1982).
Physician ignorance of price data is not universal, of course. Such information may be
relayed to the doctor by patients who receive continuing drug therapy and express their con-
cern over the cost of their prescriptions. See Reekie, Price and Quality Competition in the
United States Drug Industry, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 223, 234 (1978). Physicians may also become
aware of the costs of their prescription choices when private or public medical reimbursement
programs refuse to reimburse the patient for the difference between a low-cost, usually generic
product and its more expensive, brand-name competitor. The reaction of the physician may be
anger at the reimbursement program or pharmacy, however, rather than a heightened willing-
ness to prescribe generically.
43. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 50.
44. See Waldholz, Pillbox War, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
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ity of the brand-name drug,4 5 the threat of generic drugs to future pharma-
ceutical research and development, 46 and the value to the physician of
knowing "exactly what his patients are swallowing."4 7 Some of these claims
raise the spectre of potential malpractice liability for prescribing an inferior
generic product, though many state substitution laws provide that writing a
prescription by a generic name cannot be evidence of a physician's negli-
gence. 4' The concern generated among physicians by brand-name drug ad-
vertising might be dispelled if generic drug companies could advertise that
their products have undergone FDA bioequivalency and bioavailability tests
and are subject to FDA standards of manufacturing, but current law prohib-
its the representation or suggestion in labeling or advertising that a drug has
been approved by the FDA.49
Each of the above phenomena-habit, price ignorance, and negative ad-
vertising-works to limit the market share of generic products. However,
drug substitution laws dampen this effect. These statutes generally provide
that a pharmacist can dispense any product deemed by a formulary to be
45. See, e.g., Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1981) ("What's next ... generic physicians?" (sample advertise-
ment from medical journal)) [hereinafter cited as 1981 House Hearings]; id. at 224 ("Would
you fly a plane with no name?" (LSV Laboratories advertisement)).
46. See, e.g., id. at 225 ("Is there a generic equivalent for drug research?" (Roche adver-
tisement)); id. at 226 ("In 20 years there could be no new drugs to imitate." (Roche
advertisement)).
47. See, e.g., ANNALS INTERNAL MED., Feb. 1985, at 1-78 to 1-80 (" 'When it comes to
cardiovascular medicine, I like to know exactly what my patients are swallowing.' There are
doctors who say that generic drugs have a place in their practice-but not necessarily in the
treatment of serious or potentially life-threatening disease." (Ayerst advertisement for In-
deral)); id. at 1-179 to 1-180 (" 'When the Ayerst rep told me it costs about 45( a day, I said
you can stop right there.' " (Ayerst advertisement for Inderal asking physicians to specify
"Dispense As Written" or "Do Not Substitute" on their prescriptions)).
48. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 176 (there has been little
discussion of the physician liability issue, but at least 14 states provide that the failure to
prescribe by brand name is not evidence of negligence).
The argument that the failure to give an antisubstitution instruction could lead to physician
malpractice liability was advanced in Brennan, Drug Substitution-Boon to Consumers Versus
Legal Trap for the Professional, J. LEGAL MED., Mar. 1976, at 20, 25. At the time that article
was written, Mr. Brennan was vice-president and general counsel of the Pharmaceutical Man-
ufacturers Association.
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(l) (1982). One consumer advocate has claimed that this statutory
bar is directly responsible for some of the reluctance of physicians and pharmacists to prescribe
and dispense generically. See The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1983: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1983) (statement of Ralph Nader) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Hear-
ings]. Legislation to remove this restriction passed the House during the 98th Congress. PMA
NEWSLETTER, Apr. 8, 1985, at 5. A similar bill introduced in 1985 has passed the House and
is pending in the Senate. See infra note 245.
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equivalent to a prescribed drug unless the physician signs the prescription on
a line labeled "Do Not Substitute" or "Dispense As Written" (DAW), or, in
some states, unless the doctor writes out such an instruction.5" The rate of
drug substitution varies significantly depending on whether the statute re-
quires the doctor to write out the instruction or allows him merely to sign a
line on a preprinted form.5" If the physician needs only to choose between
signing two lines, he may inadvertantly or subconsciously sign the DAW or
"Do Not Substitute" line, and substitution will be unlawful in some cases
where the physician does not actually have a strong preference for the
brand-name product. 52 In states where the physician must write out the
antisubstitution instruction, however, studies suggest that physicians do so
infrequently.53
Drug substitution laws are therefore more effective in giving generic drugs
market access when they require the prescriber to write out language
designed to prevent substitution. The Federal Trade Commission's Model
Drug Product Selection Act requires doctors to handwrite "medically neces-
sary" in order to prevent the pharmacist from dispensing a product
equivalent to the one prescribed. 4 The Model Act attempts to require phy-
sicians to make a "conscious decision" that substitution is medically undesir-
able.55 Nevertheless, even if substitution laws increase the proportion of
prescriptions for which substitution is permitted, through provisions such as
that contained in the Model Act, the choice between drugs is simply shifted
to the pharmacist, who may also be reluctant to dispense a generic product.
50. As of 1979, approximately half of the states required that a physician write out the
antisubstitution instruction, and 19 states allowed doctors to bar substitution by signing a line
on a preprinted form. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 163-65.
51. See A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 89-97 (regression analysis of 1980
data on 45 drugs in 48 states).
52. Id. at 165, 167.
53. See id. at 164 (citing several studies); Goldberg, Aldridge, DeVito, Vidis, Moore &
Dickson, supra note 17, at 220-21 (doctors specified "Dispense As Written" on only 6.4% of
prescriptions in Michigan); Goldberg, DeVito, Smith, Stano, Vidis, Moore & Dickson, Evalua-
tion of Economic Effects of Drug Product Selection Legislation, 17 MED. CARE 411 (1979) (in
another Michigan study, doctors showed little inclination to use "Dispense As Written" in-
struction); Zeich, supra note 11, at 37 (physicians using one-line forms and required to write
out antisubstitution instructions did so only 5% of the time, but substitution was prohibited in
60% of instances where prescriber was required merely to sign on a two-line prescription
form).
54. Model Drug Product Selection Act, § 2(b), reprinted in BUREAU OF CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION, supra note 5, at 275-76. The Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) program of Medi-
caid and Medicare contains the same requirement. 42 C.F.R. § 447.332(b)(1) (1985).
55. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 10.
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b. Pharmacist Dispensing Behavior
Pharmacists receive two types of prescriptions: those written with a
drug's generic name and those written by brand name. Because pharmacists
may fill such prescriptions with a brand-name drug, generically written pre-
scriptions are not always filled with a generic product.56 Prescriptions for a
brand-name drug may be filled with a generic product whenever a state stat-
ute permits substitution and the physician does not give a valid antisubstitu-
tion instruction, but most state laws that allow selection of the drug by the
pharmacist are permissive, not mandatory. 57
Pharmacists are more likely to fill prescriptions with generic-name drugs
if they are given a financial inducement to do so. Increased use of generic
drugs decreases inventory costs because a pharmacy will not stock every
brand of a particular drug if it will be permitted to fill most prescriptions for
the drug with a generic product.5" Pharmacies also take a higher markup on
lower-cost generic drugs than they do on brand-name drugs.59 Most state
drug product selection laws also offer financial incentives. Only a few state
substitution laws require the pharmacist to pass on the full savings from
substituting a generic drug when a brand-name product was prescribed by
the physician; requiring full pass-on might discourage generic dispensing. 60
56. Id. at 47. The Masson and Steiner study indicates that 90% of prescriptions written
with a generic name are filled with a generic product, but that no more than 15% of those
written by brand name are so filled. A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 40. This
result overcomes the argument that low rates of substitution among pharmacists can be attrib-
uted to limited inventories: if generic prescriptions are filled generically, the inadequacy of
inventories will not explain the failure of pharmacists to substitute. See id. at 40-41. Overall,
more than 70% of all generic drug products dispensed are from prescriptions written by the
drug's generic name. Id. at 115-17.
Masson and Steiner acknowledge, however, that substitution rates may be understated be-
cause one-fourth of prescriptions are ordered by telephone, and the pharmacist may request
permission to dispense generically, so that the prescription may be recorded as written generi-
cally even though, if written, the physician might have used a brand name. Id. at 119-29.
57. Id. at 155-57. Of the statutes in effect in 1980, more than three-fourths provided for
permissive substitution. See A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 67. The Model
Drug Product Selection Act also makes substitution permissive. Model Drug Product Selec-
tion Act, § 2(a), reprinted in BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 274. The
FTC argues that permissive substitution will be effective as long as the pharmacist retains
incentives to substitute. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. The Masson and
Steiner study concluded that mandatory substitution may not lead to higher rates of substitu-
tion. A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 99.
58. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 88-89.
59. Id. at 94; J. EGAN, H. HIGINBOTHAM & J. WESTON, supra note 25, at 154; A. MAS-
SON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 36-37.
60. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 171-73. But see A. MASSON &
R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 99-100 (empirical analysis suggests that mandatory pass-on
provisions do not cause a lower rate of substitution).
The Model Act contains no mandatory pass-on provision. The pharmacist is not permitted
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In general, pharmacists are well-enough trained to capably choose among
drugs, 61 but the fear of liability resulting from their decision to substitute a
generic equivalent for a brand-name product deters many pharmacists from
filling prescriptions generically. 6 By substituting their judgment for the
physician's, the argument goes, the pharmacist assumes the risk that the pa-
tient will be harmed by the generic product. 63 This concern is reinforced in
advertising by brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers,'M but is un-
founded. First, liability insurance for pharmacists is accessible and premi-
ums for pharmacist insurance are low.65 Second, many state substitution
laws contain provisions stipulating that drug product substitution is not evi-
dence of negligence.66 Finally, the one legal action that has been brought
against a pharmacist in which liability was based on the pharmacist's prod-
uct selection involved the substitution of a product that had not received
FDA approval.67
3. Roche v. Bolar: Restricting Generic Testing
A recent federal court decision created a further barrier for generic manu-
facturers. In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,68 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a company's use of
another firm's patented active ingredient to perform the tests necessary to
to substitute, however, unless the substituted product is priced below the prescribed drug.
Model Drug Product Selection Act, § 2(c), reprinted in BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION,
supra note 5, at 278.
61. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 77-80 (describing four
studies demonstrating that pharmacists were more capable of judging bioavailability than phy-
sicians); id. at 80-83 (in hospitals, pharmacists, rather than physicians, are given responsibility
for selecting drugs).
62. See id. at 11, 174-75 (in a Florida survey, more than 75% of pharmacists thought they
were more vulnerable to malpractice actions under drug substitution laws); OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PATENT-TERM EXTENSION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
32 (1981); Large Drug Firms Fight Generic Substitution, 206 ScI. 1054, 1055 (1979).
63. See Brennan, supra note 48, at 23-24.
64. See Large Drug Firms Fight Generic Substitution, supra note 62, at 1054-55.
65. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 268 n.19.
66. See id. at 175. My recent survey of state substitution statutes found such provisions in
21 states. The substitution must generally be made in accordance with the "prudent practice"
of pharmacy or from a state formulary. Id.
Despite these laws, however, pharmacists in states with liability limitations are usually una-
ware of their existence. Id. at 176 (citing results of several state studies). Moreover, one recent
study indicates that such statutory provisions are not associated with higher rates of substitu-
tion by pharmacists. A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 100.
67. A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 73. Apparently, there have been no
other claims asserting liability of a pharmacist for a drug product selection. See BUREAU OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 265.
68. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 183 (1984).
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gain approval of a generic version of the patented drug was an infringing
"6use" under the federal patent law. The court refused to bring testing by a
potential competitor within the "experimental use" exception to the statute's
protection of patentholders from unauthorized uses of their inventions.6 9
The decision in Bolar fueled the controversy over the future of generic
competition. If, as seemed to be the case after Bolar, a generic company
could not do any tests with a patented active ingredient until after the patent
expired, generic competition for patented drugs could be delayed for several
years after patent expiration while the generic drug company conducted tests
and waited for FDA approval. Because the patented active ingredient is the
"drug" to which a generic copy must be equivalent, Bolar prevented any
testing, including testing for bioequivalence and bioavailability, that made
use of the active ingredient. This bar applied even if the generic company
obtained the compound legally on the market or from a licensee, or manu-
factured the compound independently.
This new impediment to the approval of generic products, together with
the delay built into the FDA drug approval process and the continuing re-
luctance of physicians and pharmacists to accept generic pharmaceutical
products, provided a new impetus for Congress to dismantle the regulatory
barriers to generic drugs. A high-dollar volume of generic drugs would go
off patent in the few years after 1984,70 and the generic industry rallied be-
hind legislative proposals to require the FDA to accept ANDAs for generic
versions of pioneer drugs.
Many members of the research-intensive pharmaceutical industry opposed
legislation giving generic drugs easier market access. For several years, how-
ever, these companies, and their trade association, the Pharmaceutical Man-
ufacturers Association (PMA), had lobbied for extended patent protection
on pioneer drugs. By the mid-1970's, FDA approval of new drugs usually
occurred long after the patenting of the drug's original compound, and the
research-intensive firms argued that this erosion in "effective patent life"
should be compensated by some form of patent term extension.
B. The Case for Patent Term Extension
The FDA requires that a new drug undergo animal tests and extensive
clinical investigations prior to approval as a new drug.? Because of this
lengthy testing process, the total time between synthesis of a potential drug
69. Id. at 862-65. See generally Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 617 (1985).
70. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Pines, A Primer on New Drug Development, FDA CONS., Feb. 1974, at
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and its eventual marketing may be as long as thirteen years.7 2 Drug research
and development is also risky: the high costs of required tests for new prod-
ucts are accompanied by a low rate of success among chemicals intitially
tested for pharmacological effects. During hearings on one version of the
patent term restoration legislation, for example, PMA's president testified
that for each 10,000 chemical molecules synthesized, only one chemical en-
tity eventually reaches the market.7 3
Many potential drugs are abandoned only after considerable testing; only
nine percent of drugs sanctioned to be tested in humans as investigational
new drugs (INDs), for instance, eventually receive FDA marketing ap-
proval.74 The costs and time lag implicit in drug innovation make the deci-
sion to develop a new drug costly,7 5 and cost and delay confront potential
innovators with disproportionate up-front costs. The costs of drug research
and development are borne long before the innovating firm begins to market
its product; the financial gains that accrue during the marketing life of a
drug, however, have a discounted present value that is greatly diminished by
even small additional delays in gaining FDA approval.76
72. See SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINIS-
TRATION'S PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS 13 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited
as FDA's DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS]; see also Pharmaceutical Innovations: Promises and
Problems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Natural Resources, Agricultural Research and the
Environment and the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Sci-
ence and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (discussing effects of drug approval process
on industry innovation) (hereinafter cited as 1981 House Innovations Hearing].
73. See The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 255 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981) (statement of Lewis A. Engman,
President, PMA) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Senate Hearing].
74. See Clymer, The Economics of Drug Innovation, in THE DEVELOPMENT AND CON-
TROL OF NEW DRUG PRODUCTS 107, 127 (M. Pernarowski & M. Darrach eds. 1972) (one-
tenth of investigational new drugs eventually approved as new drugs); Hansen, The Pharma-
ceutical Development Process.- Estimates of Development Costs and Times and the Effects of
Proposed Regulatory Changes, in ISSUES IN PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS 151, 155 (R.
Chien ed. 1979) (approval rate of 12%); Wardell, May & Trimble, New Drug Development by
United States Pharmaceutical Firms, in 32 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 407,
408 (NDAs approved between 1976 and 1979 represented only 9% of INDs granted).
75. See generally Clymer, The Changing Costs and Risks of Pharmaceutical Innovation, in
THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG INNOVATION 109 (. Cooper ed. 1970) (discussing the role of time
and development costs in innovation). Much of the costs of drug research and development
are blamed directly on FDA regulations and the testing requirements imposed by the 1962
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See Peltzman, The Benefits and Costs of
New Drug Regulation, in REGULATING NEW DRUGS 113, 207 (R. Landau ed. 1973) (1962
amendments created costs equivalent to six percent of total drug sales); Sarett, FDA Regula-
tions and Their Influence on Future R & D, RESEARCH MGMT., Mar. 1974, at 18, 18-19 (blam-
ing FDA regulation for high development costs and lengthy testing).
76. See Grabowski & Vernon, A Sensitivity Analysis of Expected Profitability of Pharma-
ceutical Research and Development, 3 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 36, 40 (1982) (an 18-
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Increasing development costs were evidenced in studies demonstrating a
thirteen-fold jump in the costs of a new drug between 1960 and 1973, 77 and
in a study by Ronald Hansen finding a total cost per new drug of $54 million
by 1976.78 But when the PMA adjusted the Hansen study result for inflation
to arrive at a per drug development cost of $87 million, consumer represent-
atives and the production-intensive industry criticized the study. Participa-
tion in the Hansen study was voluntary, and included neither all companies
nor all new drugs.79
In spite of these flaws in the studies, however, the research-intensive in-
dustry seemed to many observers to be nearing an innovation crisis: the
number of new chemical entities (NCEs) approved by the FDA as new drugs
fell by eighty-one percent between 1958 and 1979.80 Again opponents of
patent term restoration argued that these innovation figures, relied upon by
PMA, were deceptive. Representative Gore, who originally opposed patent
restoration, contended that the drop in NCEs was attributable to the elimi-
nation of drugs with little or no therapeutic value.8" Other critics pointed
out that decreased innovation could not be proven by NCE data because the
number of NCEs does not reflect innovation: of pending INDs on October
1, 1980, for example, only forty-three percent were NCEs. 2 Even so, other
studies confirmed some decrease in the rate of innovation measured not only
by NCEs, but also in new drug compounds and new dosage forms."3
month decrease in approval time is economically equivalent to adding five years of marketing
life to the product); H. Grabowski & J. Vernon, Studies on Drug Substitution, Patent Policy
and Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry (May 1983) (unpublished report), reprinted in
1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 138, 164.
77. See D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 25, at 65-70.
78. See Hansen, supra note 74, at 180.
79. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 83, 86-87 (statement of the Generic Phar-
maceutical Industry Association (GPIA)). The response rate in the Hansen study was only
56%. See Updegraff, Commentary, in ISSUES IN PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS, supra note
74, at 189.
80. See May, Wardell & Lasagna, New Drug Development During and After a Period of
Regulatory Change: Clinical Research Activity of Major United States Pharmaceutical Firms,
1958 to 1979, 33 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS 691, 691 (1983).
81. Gore, Patent Term Extension: An Expensive and Unnecessary Giveaway, HEALTH
AFF., Spring 1982, at 25, 28.
82. See Patent Term Extension and Pharmaceutical Innovation: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1982) (statement of Donna Valtri, Office of Technology Assessment)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 House Hearing].
83. See J. EGAN, H. HIGINBOTHAM & J. WESTON, supra note 25, at 106 table 7.1 (new
drug innovation between 1950 and 1974); see generally Virts & Weston, Returns to Research
and Development in the US. Pharmaceutical Industry, I MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
103 (1980) (discussing interrelationship between lower rates of return and decreased
innovation).
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Advocates of patent extension also tried to document the poor health of
the pharmaceutical industry in broader economic terms. Although the phar-
maceutical industry has long been heavily concentrated-in 1968 twenty
companies controlled nearly ninety percent of the drug market and five
companies usually occupied at least fifty percent of most therapeutic sub-
markets 84-pharmaceutical innovation has become increasingly concen-
trated. 85 The international competitive position of United States firms has
also fallen, as measured by the United States share of world pharmaceutical
research and development expeditures, the United States-owned share of
new drug introductions, and the market share of pharmaceuticals sold by
United States firms.
86
Much of the blame for these trends in the research-intensive industry has
been assigned to two factors: decreasing effective patent life for new drugs
and losses from generic competition. The following sections evaluate these
claims.
1. Loss in Effective Patent Life
In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, the term "effective patent
life" describes the period between FDA approval of a patented drug product
and the expiration of that product's patent. Although it is theoretically pos-
sible for effective patent life to exceed the nominal seventeen-year patent
grant of the federal patent statute when the FDA approves a drug before the
Patent and Trademark Office issues the patent, the effective patent life for
drug products is normally less than seventeen years. Much of the loss in
effective patent life, if lost patent life is defined as the difference between
effective patent life and seventeen years, is accounted for by the time during
which innovating firms conduct the tests required to gain FDA approval.
During the 1970's and early 1980's, numerous published studies estimated
a sharp decline in effective patent life for new drugs. The PMA and re-
search-intensive drug firms asserted that this data justified their call for pat-
ent restoration legislation. The results of the different studies varied, but
they documented a clear trend: effective patent life prior to the 1962 amend-
ments was near the full seventeen years specified by the patent laws, but for
84. See Jadlow, supra note 32, at 104-05.
85. See Grabowski & Vernon, Innovation and Invention: Consumer Protection Regulation
in Ethical Drugs, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 360-61 (1977). One writer argues to the contrary,
however, that the pharmaceutical industry is very stable even though the large companies in
the industry have continued their dominance. See Cocks, Product Innovation and the Dynamic
Elements of Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry, in DRUG DEVELOPMENT &
MARKETING 225, 240-45 (R. Helms ed. 1975).
86. See THE COMPETITIVE STATUS OF THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21-53
(Nat'l Academy Press 1983).
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drugs approved in 1981, effective patent life had fallen to less than seven
years.8 7
Opponents of patent extension developed several arguments that uncov-
ered flaws in the effective patent life studies. They concluded that many of
the studies were biased because they measured effective patent life only for
new chemical entities, and not for all drugs.88 The studies also calculated
effective patent life using the earliest patent applicable to each drug, even
though many drugs have multiple patents that can extend the product's
practical monopoly beyond the period covered by the earliest patent.8 9 The
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Association countered PMA's estimates of
effective patent life with its own calculation that, for the highest selling drug
products, effective patent life might be as high as 18.5 years.90
Estimates of effective patent life have limited usefulness as tools for justi-
87. See Drug Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1983) (average effec-
tive patent life (EPL) from 1962 to 1970 was 12.5 years, but by the late 1970's had declined to
between 9 and 10 years) (FDA staff report submitted by Dr. Mark A. Novitch, Deputy
Comm'r, FDA) [hereinafter cited as 1983 House Drug Legislation Hearings]; 1983 Senate
Hearings, supra note 49, at 34-35 (EPL for new chemical entities approved during 1980 and
1981 was 7.06 years in 1980 and 6.72 years in 1981) (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Acting Deputy Secretary of Commerce and Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks); 1982 House
Hearing, supra note 82, at 77 (EPL declined to 6.8 years in 1981) (testimony of Dr. William M.
Wardell, Director, Center for the Study of Drug Development); H. GRABOWSKI & J.
VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING BENEFITS AND RISKS 50
(1983) (EPL in 1979 was 9.5 years); D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 25, at 167-73 (mean EPL
between 1966 and 1973 was 13.1 years); Eisman & Wardell, The Decline in Effective Patent
Life of New Drugs, RESEARCH MGMT., Jan. 1981, at 18, 19 (EPL decreased from 13.6 years in
1966 to 9.5 years in 1979); Grabowski & Vernon, Substitution Laws and Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 1979, at 43, 59 (EPL in
1977 was 8.9 years); Hutt, The Importance of Patent Term Restoration to Pharmaceutical Inno-
vation, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1982, at 6, 16-17 (EPL of 18.2 years in 1950 declined to 8.8 years
by 1977) (study by Pracon, Inc.); id. at 17 (PMA data for 1980 showed EPL for drugs ap-
proved that year was 7.4 years); Statman, The Effect of Patent Expiration on the Market Posi-
tion of Drugs, in DRUGS & HEALTH: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY OBJECTIVES 140, 142
(R. Helms ed. 1981) (EPL was 16.5 years in 1960 but only 9.7 years in 1978).
88. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (NCEs account for less than half of drug
innovation).
89. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 82, at 281 (testimony of William F. Haddad,
President, GPIA) (specifically criticizing the article by Eisman & Wardell, supra note 87).
90. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 82, at 210-11 (statement of Kenneth N. Larsen,
Chairman, GPIA). Peter Hutt, representing the PMA, responded to this study with three
criticisms. First, the GPIA study includes only high dollar-volume drugs. Second, many of
the drugs on the GPIA list were approved prior to 1968, so the GPIA data does not really
conflict with studies estimating effective patent life for drugs first approved in the 1970's. Fi-
nally, most of the drugs on the GPIA list would not have been eligible for patent restoration
even under the liberal (compared to the 1984 Act) standards for patent extension included in
the legislation pending at the time of the GPIA testimony. Id. at 171-72 (statement of Peter B.
Hutt, on behalf of PMA).
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fying patent extension, moreover, because they ignore the reality that many
inventions are not ready for marketing at the moment a patent is issued.
Even without FDA approval requirements, for example, drug manufacturers
would perform tests to measure the safety and efficacy of their new products.
All of the effective patent life studies included the time gap between the issu-
ance of a patent and the patentholder's application to have the new product
classified as an IND,9  but the animal tests that take place during the pre-
IND period would probably be conducted absent federal regulation. The
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act accounts for this
bias in effective patent life studies by restoring none of the time that elapses
before the IND is filed and only half of the IND pendency period.92
Critics of patent restoration also contended that pharmaceutical innova-
tors abuse the patent process by dilatory techniques like patent application
continuances and the substitution of new patent applications for pending
applications. 93 One study concluded, however, that much of the recent de-
cline in effective patent life is attributable to a decrease in the patent pen-
dency period, 94 a phenomenon that belies the suggestion that many drug
patents are subject to delaying tactics.95 Patents for drug compounds are
issued an average of twenty-eight months after the patent application is
filed,96 and for pioneer compounds patents usually issue within two years.97
Finally, the practice of obtaining multiple patents on a single pharmaceu-
tical product has been criticized because multiple patents will sometimes ex-
tend exclusive marketing rights. Some drugs will be protected not only by a
patent that describes the compound (compound patent), but will also be de-
scribed in patents issued for a drug manufacturing process (process patents)
and for methods of use for the drugs (use patents). If process and use pat-
ents exclude potential competitors from marketing a drug on which the com-
pound patent has expired, studies based on compound patents will fail to
reflect the true length of protection afforded by patents to innovative phar-
91. Gore, supra note 81, at 29.
92. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Engelberg, Patent Term Extension: An Overreaching Solution to a Nonexis-
tent Problem, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1982, at 34, 38.
94. When drug patents are issued more quickly, the 17-year patent grant begins to run at
an earlier stage in the drug development process, and the effective life of the patent is lessened.
95. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 82, at 72 (statement of Dr. William M. Wardell,
Director, Center for the Study of Drug Development) (27% of decline in EPL resulted from
lessened patent pendency period).
96. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 25 (testimony of Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Acting Deputy Secretary of Commerce and Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks).
97. See 1981 Senate Hearing, supra note 73, at 22 (statement of Lewis A. Engman, Presi-
dent, PMA).
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maceutical products.9" Nevertheless, product and use patents are probably
ineffective in extending exclusive rights to drug products. As for any inven-
tion, a basic drug compound patent will disclose the original methods of use
and manufacture for a patented drug, and a subsequent use or product pat-
ent could not bar a generic drug manufacturer from making the drug for its
unprotected uses once the patent expires.9 9 Even if continuing use patents
theoretically forestall marketing of a generic drug for its still-protected uses,
moreover, it will be impossible for the patentholder to police the uses to
which pharmacists, physicians, and patients put the generic copy."
Even accepting the criticisms that the decline in effective patent life over
the last several years was not as dramatic as the research-intensive industry
claimed, some real decline in patent protection is evident in the lengthening
gap between submission of an IND and eventual FDA approval of new
drugs. Patent protection is an important variable in the research and devel-
opment decision: adequate protection provides the economic incentive that
justifies high expenditures during the period of drug development, when the
innovating firm makes outlays that can only be recovered, if at all, by long-
term sales revenue.' 0 '
2. Loss from Generic Competition
Patents are valuable to patentholders precisely because they forestall com-
petition. For a limited period of time society tells innovators: "Charge what
the market will bear until your patent expires, but at the end of that period
the market may limit you to competitive returns." The innovator relies on
the exclusive marketing grant, the patent, to guarantee him the opportunity
to recover research and development costs plus a real rate of return on that
investment. Whether the patentholder's period of exclusive marketing is ad-
equate to capture these economic opportunities depends on two factors: the
product life of the drug and the total time necessary to recover the research
and development investment. Product life for new drugs is usually long
enough. One recent study estimated that the average prescription drug
98. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 82, at 5 (statement of Donna Valtri, Office of
Technology Assessment).
99. See id. at 169-70 (statement of Peter B. Hutt, on behalf of PMA); 1981 House Hear-
ings, supra note 45, at 410 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Comm'r of Patents and Trade-
marks); Hutt, supra note 87, at 19.
100. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 410 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks).
101. See generally Kiley, The Importance of Patent Term Restoration to Small High Tech-
nology Companies, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1982, at 46 (patent protection especially important
for small firms); Yorke, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 4 MEDICINAL RESEARCH REvs. 25
(1984) (defending value of drug patents).
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product has a useful life of more than thirty years.'o 2 Another study calcu-
lated that, depending on the various rates of return assumed by the studies'
authors, between twelve and nineteen years of exclusive marketing life would
be needed by the patentholder to recover his initial cost plus a normal rate of
return.10 3
Patents are relatively unimportant, however, unless the patentholder faces
a threat of competition once the patent expires. Greater use of generic drugs
magnifies the effect of shortened effective patent life on an innovating firm's
ability to recover its research and development expenditures. When market
competition begins sooner because the patentholder has a shorter period of
market exclusivity, the expected losses to competitive products have a
greater present value than they would if substitution occurred several years
later. Simply stated, the time value of a $100 loss five years from now will,
at every discount rate, be greater than the present value of the same loss in
ten years. 104
The extent of post-patent generic competition thus has a crucial impact on
the value of patent term extension. If generic competition is insignificant,
patent term restoration does not restore much revenue to the brand-name
manufacturer.' In the past, expiration of patents did not bring an on-
slaught of generic competitors, and brand-name products suffered only insig-
nificant losses to competition. 106 As the generic market grew, however, the
value of patent extension legislation to the research-intensive pharmaceutical
industry increased. By delaying the future economic loss from competition,
patent extension can make the present value of that loss insignificant. In
other words, longer patent life might almost completely offset, for the brand-
name manufacturer, the monetary disincentive to innovation posed by the
threat of generic competition. 0 7
102. See M. STATMAN, supra note 25, at 34.
103. See Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 76, at 36 (at 10% real rate of return recovery
would take 19 years, but at 8% discount rate recovery takes only 12 years). The theories of
optimum patent life described in the economic literature correspond to the model set out by
Grabowski and Vernon. See W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE 76-86
(1969); Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 87, at 63-66; Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a
Patent: Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 428 (1972); Scherer, Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent
Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972).
104. Cf H. GRABOWSKI & J. VERNON, supra note 87, at 57-58; Grabowski & Vernon,
supra note 87, at 48.
105. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 43.
106. See M. STATMAN, supra note 25, at 63; Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 87, at 60.
107. See Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 87, at 61; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 42-43 (patent term restoration has significant effect in competi-
tive market); Statman, supra note 87, at 225 (statement of William Comanor) (there is a mar-
ket tradeoff between low pharmaceutical prices and drug research and development).
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3. Legislative Attempts To Restore Incentives for Innovation
Most of these arguments were reiterated during congressional considera-
tion of the several patent term restoration bills introduced since 1981. Ad-
vocates of such legislation pointed to the real declines in drug innovation
and patent protection experienced by their industry, while opponents of pat-
ent extension insisted that these problems were being overstated. The oppo-
nents argued that additional patent protection would not decrease research
and development costs, increase the number of innovative breakthroughs, or
ensure the commercial success of new drug products."0 8 Most consumer
groups opposed any form of patent term restoration, recognizing that the
potential benefits of longer patent protection to drug research and develop-
ment could be matched by costs imposed on consumers as a result of delayed
competition.'19
While patent legislation stalled in Congress, 1 0 two other initiatives
designed to encourage pharmaceutical innovation took effect. The first, a
general tax credit of twenty-five percent for all research and development
expenditures, expired at the end of 1985.11 The other, the Orphan Drug
Act, authorizes tax credits1 12 and market exclusivity periods to encourage
research into drug therapies for what are defined in the Act as "orphan"
diseases."1 3 Research and development expenditures for orphan drugs re-
108. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 39.
109. See H.R. REP. No. 696, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23 (dissenting remarks of Rep.
Frank); see also BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 225 (study by Schifrin
showing that consumer gains from substitution outweigh substitution's effect on research and
development); id. at 226-27 (study by Jadlow demonstrates that drug product substitution has
only a negligible effect on research and development).
110. See The Push to Protect Patents on New Drugs, 222 SCi. 593, 594 (1983).
111. See I.R.C. § 30 (West Supp. 1985) (provision expired on Dec. 31, 1985). Proposed
legislation to renew this provision was introduced in this Congress. See, e.g., S. 58, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S180 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985). However, the credit provision
lapsed at the end of last year. Some of the various tax reform proposals pending in Congress
reinstate the credit in some form, although at least one proposal would weaken it. See PMA
NEWSLETTER, Oct. 14, 1985, at 1. The tax reform package presently before the Senate Fi-
nance Committee restores the 25% credit. Id., March 17, 1986, at 1.
112. The Internal Revenue Service did not publish proposed regulations for the use of the
orphan drug tax credit until last year. See 50 Fed. Reg. 15,930 (1985). It appears that no firm
has yet received or filed for the credit. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Apr. 22, 1985, at 1.
113. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049, 2050-51 (1982), amended by
Pub. L. No. 98-551, § 4, 98 Stat. 2815, 2817. An "orphan drug" is a drug for a "rare disease
or condition," defined in the statute as a disease or condition affecting fewer than 200,000
persons in the United States or affecting more than 200,000 persons but for which there is no
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and marketing a drug for the disease or
condition will be recovered from sales of the drug in the United States. 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 360bb(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
The Act also authorizes protocol assistance and grants. See generally Finkel, The Orphan
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ceive a fifty percent tax credit, 1 4 and orphan drugs are guaranteed a seven-
year exclusive marketing license for their orphan disease applications."'
Patent term legislation was introduced again in the first session of the 98th
Congress, 16 but the proposal faced strong opposition. During the same year
Congressman Waxman, who had been one of the major critics of patent res-
toration proposals, introduced a bill to authorize the FDA to approve ge-
neric copies of approved drugs through ANDAs. 1 7 When it became clear
that neither proposal could muster sufficient support to pass through Con-
gress alone," 18 spokesmen for each bill agreed to combine the two pieces of
legislation. After lengthy negotiations, the bill was reported out of House
and Senate committees in early summer 1984.'19 Floor efforts to make fur-
ther changes in the bill were defeated, and on September 6 and 12 respec-
tively, the House and Senate passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984.120 The new Act was signed into law by Pres-
ident Reagan on September 24, 1984.121
Drug Act and the Federal Government's Orphan Products Development Program, 99 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 313 (1984) (describing the Act).
114. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 4, 96 Stat. 2049, 2053-56 (1982) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 28 (West Supp. 1985)).
115. Id. § 2, 96 Stat. 2049, 2050-51 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (1982)).
The provisions of the Orphan Drug Act were extended by Congress in 1985. Orphan Drug
Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387. The original act offered market exclu-
sivity periods only to drugs that were ineligible for patents. The newly amended law recog-
nizes that a seven-year exclusivity period will often exceed postapproval patent life. See H.R.
REP. No. 153, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
301, 302-05. The amendments authorize market exclusivity even for patentable orphan drugs.
Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, § 2, 99 Stat. at 387.
116. See S. 1306, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S6383-84 (daily ed. May 17,
1983); H.R. 3502, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H4895 (daily ed. June 30, 1983).
117. See H.R. 3605, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H5273 (daily ed. July 19,
1983).
118. See The Price for More Generic Drugs, 224 Sci. 369 (1984).
119. See S. REP. No. 547, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 1, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2647; H.R. REP. No. 857,
pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2686.
A group of dissident PMA-member companies insisted on further concessions and assur-
ances before the bill reached its final form in September, 1984. See H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 1,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-76, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2647, 2681-86;
PMA NEWSLETTER, July 2, 1984, at 3-4 (discussing split among PMA members over the
Act).
120. See H.R. 3605, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H9145 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984);
S. 1538, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S10,989-90 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1984).
121. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585 (1984).
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II. THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION
ACT OF 1984
The Act consists of three titles, of which only two concern us here. Title I
addresses abbreviated New Drug Applications; title II authorizes patent
term extension and makes other changes in the patent law. Title III, which
is irrelevant to this article, is an amendment to the Act that originated in the
Senate that requires textile product labels to identify the country in which
the textile product was manufactured. 122
A. Progeneric Provisions of the Act
1. ANDAs
The Act amends section 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to
permit the filing and approval of abbreviated New Drug Applications for
generic copies of pioneer drugs.123 ANDAs must contain information show-
ing: that the approval is sought only for uses already approved for the pio-
neer drug; that the active ingredients and the route of administration, dosage
form, and strength of the new drug are the same as those of the pioneer
drug; 124 that the generic is bioequivalent to, and bioavailable to the same
extent as, the pioneer; that the labeling of the generic will be the same as that
for the pioneer; the details of the ingredients and manufacturing process of
the generic; and a certification that approval of the ANDA will not violate a
patent held by the maker of the pioneer.' 25
The Act enumerates the circumstances that will justify FDA disapproval
of an ANDA.126 If the ANDA is disapproved, the applicant must be given
122. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, § 301, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603-05 (1984).
123. See id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1586 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(1)). The provision,
which merely speaks of a drug that contains an active ingredient that has been "previously
approved," applies to drugs approved in NDAs both before and after 1962.
124. If an applicant desires to file an ANDA for a drug whose active ingredient or route of
administration, dosage form, or strength differ from that of the pioneer drug, a petition for
permission to file an ANDA must be submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices. The Secretary is required to approve the petition unless he makes a finding that addi-
tional investigations must be conducted to show the safety and efficacy of the new drug or that
on the basis of an ANDA the new drug could not be adequately evaluated for safety and
effectiveness. Approval or disapproval of the petition must take place within 90 days. Id.
§ 101, 98 Stat. at 1587 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(C)).
125. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1585-86 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)).
126. The Secretary "shall approve" an ANDA unless the Secretary finds: that the methods
used in the manufacture, processing, and packing of the generic product are inadequate to
assure the drug's strength, identity, quality, and purity; that the ANDA contains insufficient
information to show that the proposed conditions of use have been previously approved for the
pioneer; that the application contains insufficient information to show that the active ingredi-
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notice of an opportunity for a hearing.' 27 The FDA must act on an abbrevi-
ated New Drug Application within 180 days of the initial receipt of the ap-
plication, unless the applicant and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services agree to an additional period for FDA consideration of the
ANDA.' 2 8 This provision should be distinguished from the statute gov-
erning FDA approval of full NDAs. Under that statute, the FDA must
approve or disapprove an NDA within 180 days of its filing. 129 The FDA
has construed an NDA to be "filed" within the meaning of the statute only
when the NDA is substantially ready for final evaluation.' 3°
New Drug Applications for pioneer drugs must, after the Act, identify all
product and use patents for the drug.' Consequently, an ANDA must
certify that the generic drug will not infringe any patents held by the maker
of the pioneer drug, that any patents on the pioneer drug have expired or the
date on which relevant patents will expire, or that the patent on the pioneer
drug is invalid.' 32 If the ANDA applicant certifies a future date or dates on
which the patent or patents will expire, but does not assert that the product
for which the ANDA seeks approval will not infringe the patents or that the
patents are invalid, the effective date of an approved ANDA will be the date
of patent expiration certified by the ANDA applicant.' 33 If the ANDA ap-
plicant certifies only that the relevant patents have expired or that the pio-
neer drug's NDA contained no patent information, the ANDA will be made
ent of the generic is the same as that of the pioneer; that, unless a petition was granted, the
route of administration, dosage form, or strength of the generic drug are not the same as the
pioneer; that it does not contain the information required by the petition submitted under the
proper procedure (described supra note 124); that the application fails to show bioequivalence
or bioavailability; that the approved labeling for the generic is not the same as that for the
pioneer; that the ANDA shows that the generic drug is unsafe under the conditions of use
intended for the drug; that the pioneer drug of which the generic is a copy has been withdrawn
or suspended from the market under § 505(e) for reasons of safety or effectiveness; that the
ANDA fails to contain any of the information required by § 355(j)(2)(A); or that the ANDA
contains any untrue statement of material fact. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1587-88 (to be codified at
21 U.S.C. § 3550)(3)).
127. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1589-90 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(C)). This re-
quirement parallels the existing statute for approval of drugs in an NDA. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(c)(2) (1982). If the applicant chooses to accept the opportunity for hearing by written
request within 30 days after the notice, the hearing must commence within 90 days after the
expiration of the 30-day period unless the Secretary and the applicant agree otherwise. The
hearing is to be expedited, and the Secretary's order on the hearing must be issued within 90
days after the date fixed by the Secretary for filing final briefs. Id.
128. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. at 1588 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(4)(A)).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (1982).
130. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.101 (1985).
131. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 102, 98 Stat. 1585, 1592 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)).
132. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1586 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)).
133. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1588-89 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(ii)).
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effective immediately upon approval. 134
If the ANDA contains a certification that the generic drug will not in-
fringe existing patents or that existing patents are invalid, however, the
ANDA applicant must give notice to the patentholder (and the holder of the
approved pioneer NDA, if different) that the ANDA has been submitted.
The notice must include a detailed explanation of the applicant's factual and
legal basis for the claim that the original patent is invalid or not infringed. 35
If the patentholder fails to bring an action for infringement within forty-five
days of the receipt of the notice,' 36 an ANDA shall be made effective imme-
diately if otherwise approvable. 13 If an infringement suit is brought, how-
ever, the FDA cannot make the ANDA approval effective for thirty months
from the date of the notice from the applicant to the patentholder, unless the
trial court decides prior to that time that the patent is invalid or not in-
fringed.' 38 If the infringement action is still pending after thirty months, the
FDA has no authority to refuse to make an approvable ANDA effective.
This patent challenge provision has been criticized on two grounds. First,
ANDA applicants are given an incentive to challenge potentially valid pat-
ents. 1' The first ANDA applicant who challenges the patent is given a 180-
day head start over any future ANDAs, 1" and if the patentholder fails to
file his suit within forty-five days-an extraordinarily short period for inti-
tiating such complex litigation-an approved ANDA will be made effective
immediately. Second, just as the giving of notice by an ANDA applicant
involves little cost and encourages patent litigation, '' the thirty-month de-
lay in generic competition assured when a patent infringement suit is filed
134. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1588-89 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(i)).
135. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1586 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)).
136. The Act makes the filing of an ANDA, the approval of which would infringe a valid
patent, an act of infringement itself, so the ANDA filing and notice triggers the patentholder's
right to bring an infringement suit. See id. § 202, 98 Stat. at 1603 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)).
137. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1588-89 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)).
138. Id. The Act does not extend the period to the full 30 months if the trial court decision
is appealed. Unless the trial court stays its judgment, once the ANDA applicant secures a
favorable trial judgment the FDA must make an approved ANDA effective.
139. See Johnstone, Impact of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984 on the Generic Industry-Business Considerations and Potential Legal Issues, 40 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 339, 341 (1985).
140. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(4)(B)(iv)).
141. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Hearing on S.
2748 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 206-07
(1984) (statement of William E. Schuyler, Jr., Esq.) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Senate Hearing];
Ryan, Impact of the Act on Research-Based Industry, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 345, 348
(1985).
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provides an incentive for patentholders to defend weak and even invalid pat-
ents. Unless the patent litigation terminates in less than thirty months, an
unlikely result in most federal courts, the holder of even an invalid patent is
permitted to extend his exclusive market power, without facing damages,
merely by filing an infringement suit.142
The Act also codifies the paper NDA procedure for copies of drugs origi-
nally approved under section 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.143
Yet because the ANDA procedure does not require an applicant to submit
the reports of published studies required for paper NDAs,'" the paper
NDA procedure is unlikely to be used by many applicants.145
Finally, the Act authorizes ANDAs only for drugs originally approved
under section 505. Because many drugs are approved under other sections,
ANDAs seem not to be available for several classes of drugs. The FDA has
already concluded that batch-certified antibiotics, which are approved under
section 507,146 are not eligible for ANDAs. 147 The Act also makes no provi-
sion for permitting licensees of a patentholder to submit an ANDA, and
because the FDA cannot make an ANDA effective before the pioneer's pat-
ents have expired, a full NDA would appear to be required.148 Veterinary
drugs are also excluded from the ANDA provisions in the Act.149
142. See 130 CONG. REC. H9115 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
143. See Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 103, 98 Stat. 1585, 1593-97 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(2)).
144. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
145. See J. Hoffman, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984:
An Overview (Nov. 13, 1984) (paper delivered to the Food and Drug Law Institute); Hutt,
Drug Bill Balances Patent Protection, Competition, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 1984, at 8, 8.
146. 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1982).
147. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Nov. 19, 1984, at 1; J. Hoffman, supra note 145. Antibiotics
that are not batch certified are approved under § 505, and are therefore within the Act's
ANDA provisions. PMA NEWSLETTER, Jan. 7, 1985, at 7. PMA has complained that be-
cause the Bolar reversal provisions of the Act apply to all drugs, including antibiotics,
patentholders should be afforded the protection that the notice provisions of Title I of the Act
guarantee. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
Insulin and biologics are also excluded from the Act's ANDA and market exclusivity provi-
sions. See Pape, Market Exclusivity Under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Resto-
ration Act of 1984-The Five Clauses, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 310, 315-16 (1985) (insulin
approved under 21 U.S.C. § 356 (1982) and biologics approved under 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1982)).
148. See Johnstone, supra note 139, at 341. Of course, a license holder might bargain with
the patentholder and agree that the ANDA would not infringe a patent (and with a valid
license it probably would not). The license holder could then certify noninfringment, and
when the 45-day waiting period expired FDA could make an approved ANDA effective.
149. See 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 141, at 17-18 (statement of Dr. Mark A. Novitch,
Acting Comm'r, FDA). Veterinary drugs are approved under § 512 of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360b (1982).
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2. Statutory Reversal of Roche v. Bolar
The Act reverses the result of Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuti-
cal Co. 15o In Bolar, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit held that a generic manufacturer could not "use" a patented pioneer
drug product to conduct the tests necessary for FDA approval of a generic
drug. '51 The Act overrules Bolar by providing that it is not an act of patent
infringement "to make, use, or sell a patented invention. . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under
a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."' 5 2
The Bolar provision does not specify that the information "submitted"
under a federal drug law be required to be submitted by that law. Nor is the
provision limited to the compilation of information necessary to submit an
ANDA, instead, the statute refers to "any Federal law" regulating the man-
ufacture, use, or sale of drugs. Thus, as the provision is written, it would not
be an act of infringement for a manufacturer to conduct tests needed to sub-
mit a paper NDA for a generic copy of the new drug, or a full NDA for a
use or dosage form not already approved in the pioneer drug's NDA.15 3
During congressional hearings it was suggested that the retroactive rever-
sal of Bolar would work an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights
on some patentholders. This issue will be litigated. The Bolar provision ap-
plies to patents issued before the enactment of the 1984 Act as well as to
future patents. Because the Bolar decision found that the use of a patented
product for testing in anticipation of drug approval was an infringing use, it
is possible to argue that holders of patents issued before the effective date of
the Act possessed a property right to be shielded from infringing uses of the
type adjudicated in Bolar. If so, the retroactive reversal of Bolar may be a
"taking" of that property right without compensation. As critics of the pro-
vision testified during the Senate hearings on the Act, if the health interest in
reversing Bolar is insufficient to justify an exercise of police power that
would allow an uncompensated taking, then this provision in the Act would
be unconstitutional when applied retroactively. 15
4
150. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 183 (1984).
151. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
152. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1)).
153. See infra notes 291-94 and accompanying text.
154. This analysis traces the argument made by Professor Dorsen in the 1984 hearings on
the Act. See 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 141, at 179-203 (statement of Prof. Norman
Dorsen, New York University School of Law); see also Krulwich, Statutory Reversal of Roche
v. Bolar: What You See Is Only the Beginning of What You Get, 40 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J.
519 (1985) (suggesting similar arguments). During congressional consideration of the Act,
others expressed similar doubts regarding the constitutionality of the Bolar provision. See
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Supporters of the Act's Bolar reversal responded to each of these argu-
ments. Bolar, they claimed, was merely a statutory interpretation by a single
court,155 and Congress remained free to provide a legislative definition for
the term "use." The Bolar reversal does this. Bolar was also a unique case
because its interpretation of the patent statute had never before been reached
in a judicial decision. Therefore, the exercise of police power does not de-
prive patentholders of any investment-based reliance interest.' 56 Moreover,
Congress' interest in public health is served by the Bolar reversal if less ex-
pensive drugs are thereby made available to some who could not otherwise
afford them. This justification for the provision, according to its proponents,
validates use of the police power in these circumstances.' 57
B. Pro-Brand Manufacturer Provisions of the Act
1. Market Exclusivity Periods
The Act creates five different exclusivity periods for drugs approved by
the FDA after 1981 in full or supplemental NDAs (See Table). There is no
magic to the distinctions made by these various periods; rather, they reflect
the legislative compromises implicit throughout the Act. Some new drugs or
drug uses will receive exclusivity protection that will run simultaneously
with patent protection, but products that are not protected by patents, or
that are ineligible for patents, can also be given exclusive marketing life.'
51
This sort of incentive for innovation is not new with this Act-market exclu-
sivity is also granted in the 1982 Orphan Drug Act.159 Postmarketing exclu-
sivity does more than guarantee some return of drug innovation costs: it
also provides the pioneer manufacturer with an exclusive market within
which the drug can be studied for further safety and effectiveness data and
possible adverse drug reaction problems.' 60
Each of the Act's five exclusivity provisions is contained in the sections
governing the submission or earliest effective date of ANDAs and paper
NDAs. None of the exclusivity provisions prevents a competitor from mar-
Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
677-87 (1984) (letter of James F. Fitzpatrick, Esq., Arnold & Porter); id. at 741-58 (memoran-
dum of Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School).
155. See Bolar, 733 F.2d at 861.
156. See H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2686, 2712-13.
157. See id. at 28, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2712.
158. See Ryan, supra note 141, at 347.
159. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
160. See 1983 House Drug Legislation Hearings, supra note 87, at 6-9 (testimony of Dr.
Mark A. Novitch, Deputy Comm'r, FDA); id. at 133 (statement of PMA).
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keting, or the FDA from approving, a generic copy during the exclusivity
period for the pioneer drug if FDA approval is obtained through a full
NDA.
Two of the provisions apply only to drugs approved between January 1,
1982, and September 24, 1984 (the date of enactment). For any NCE ap-
proved in an NDA during that period, an approved ANDA or paper NDA
may not be made effective for ten years after the date of approval of the
pioneer's NDA. '6 1
MARKET EXCLUSIVITY GRANTS UNDER THE ACT
approval
date before Jan. 1, Jan. 1, 1982, to after Sept. 24,
1982 Sept. 24, 1982 1982
type of
pioneer
ANDA or paper
NDA cannot be
cannot make ANDA D cantbor paper NDA submitted prior to
NCE none orfe e pa r NA y 5 years after NDANCE none ~ ~~~effective or 10 years apoabt4ya
after NDA approval approval, but 4 yearlimitation applies if
patent challenged
NON-NCEs cannot make ANDA cannot make ANDA
or paper NDA or paper NDANDA none effective before Sept. effective for 3 years
24, 1986 after date of NDA
approval
cannot make ANDA
or paper NDA
effective for change
cannot make ANDA reported in
Supplement none or paper NDA supplement for 3
effective before Sept. years after approval,
24, 1986 supplement must
contain reports of
essential new clinical
investigations
For non-NCEs approved in an NDA or supplemental NDA between 1982
161. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1590 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(4)(D)(i)); id. § 103, 98 Stat. at 1595 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(D)(i)).
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and the date of enactment, an approved ANDA or paper NDA may not be
made effective before September 24, 1986.162
The other three exclusivity periods apply to drugs approved by FDA after
September 24, 1984. For post-enactment NCEs, an ANDA or paper NDA
cannot be submitted to the FDA prior to five years after the date of approval
of the pioneer NDA.163 If it contains a certificate of patent invalidity or
noninfringement, however, an ANDA or a paper NDA may be submitted
four years after the date of approval.' 6 Thus, even if the patent that pro-
tects an NCE is invalid, the original drug is guaranteed at least four years of
market exclusivity. If the patentholder files an infringement suit, the thirty-
month delay in the effective date of the ANDA or the paper NDA is added
to the usual five-year exclusivity term, so that an approved ANDA or paper
NDA would not take effect until 7.5 years after the pioneer NDA is
approved. 1
65
Generic versions of non-NCE drugs approved in an NDA cannot be made
effective for three years after the approval date.166 If a supplemental NDA
contains reports of new clinical investigations "essential" '1 67 to the approval
of the supplement and conducted or sponsored by the applicant, an ANDA
or pap-r NDA for the change reflected in the supplemental NDA cannot be
made effective for three years after the date of approval.' 68
2. Patent Term Extension
Title II of the Act adds a patent extension provision to the federal patent
statutes. Patent extension is permitted for any "product" whose patent has
not expired, if a patent extension application has been submitted, if the prod-
uct was subject to regulatory review by a federal authority before the prod-
162. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1591 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)(v)); id. § 103, 98
Stat. at 1596-97 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(D)(v)).
163. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1590 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)(ii)); id. § 103, 98
Stat. at 1595-96 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(D)(ii)).
164. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1590 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)(ii)); id. § 103, 98
Stat. at 1595-96 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(D)(ii)).
165. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1590 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)(ii)); id. § 103, 98
Stat. at 1595-96 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(D)(ii)).
166. Id. § 101, 98 Stat. at 1590 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(D)(iii)); id. § 103, 98
Stat. at 1596 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(D)(iii)).
167. The Act does not define "essential studies." See Pape, supra note 147, at 314-15. The
FDA has taken the position that the Act intends that such studies be human studies, and that
animal studies do not qualify a supplement for exclusivity. The Act's sponsors, Representative
Waxman and Senator Hatch, have stated publicly that FDA's conclusion is correct. See PMA
NEWSLETTER, Aug. 28, 1985, at 4-5.
168. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585, 1590-91 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(4)(D)(iv)); id. § 103, 98 Stat. at 1596 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(D)(iv)).
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uct's commercial marketing or use, and if the commercial marketing or use
after the regulatory review period was the first marketing or use under the
law under which the regulatory review occurred. 169 A "product" is defined
by the Act as a "human drug product" or a "medical device, food additive,
or color additive subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act."
1 70
An application for patent extension must be filed within sixty days after
the product is approved, 17 1 so the Act applies to products whose regulatory
review period ended on or after July 26, 1984. Patent extension applications
are submitted to the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, who for-
wards the application to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for
determination of the regulatory review period applicable to the product.
172
The regulatory review period for drug products is equal to half the IND
period plus the full period during which the NDA is pending. 173 The sum of
the patent extension and the amount of the patent remaining after the prod-
uct finishes the regulatory review cannot exceed fourteen years.' 74 Further-
more, the maximum extension is five years, 17 5 and only one patent per drug
may be extended.' 76 A patent extension applies only to the uses claimed in
the patent extended,' 77 and thus would not apply to any nondrug uses for a
drug product, nor to any new drug uses devised and approved that were not
claimed in the extended patent.
A finding of the regulatory review period must be published in the Federal
Register within thirty days after the receipt by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services of the patent extension application.178 Within 180 days af-
ter publication of that determination, anyone may submit a petition to the
169. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1598 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)).
For a patent that claims a method of manufacture that primarily uses recombinant DNA
technology, the permission for the commercial marketing or use must be the first period of
review under the process claimed in the patent.
170. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1600 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(0(1)).
171. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1599 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1)).
172. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1599 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(d)(1), 156(d)(2)(A)).
173. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1601 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 156(g)(1)). See PMA
NEWSLETTER, Feb. 18, 1985, at 2-3; Hutt, supra note 145, at 12. The statute refers to the date
on which an NDA is initially submitted, distinguishing that date from the date on which the
FDA will consider the FDA filed. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30; H.R. REP. No.
857, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2647,
2677.
174. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 201(a), 98 Stat. 1585, 1599 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(c)(3)).
175. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1602 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)( 4 )).
176. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1599 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(4)).
177. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1598 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(b)).
178. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1599 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(2)(A)).
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Secretary asserting that the patentholder did not act with "due diligence"
during the regulatory review period. 179 The Secretary must make a determi-
nation on the due diligence petition within ninety days, and may delegate the
authority to make the due diligence determination to the Commissioner of
the FDA.1 8
0
The Act provides that the regulatory review period set by the Secretary
will be reduced by the amount of time during which the extension applicant
did not act with due diligence, 8' but the due diligence procedure will proba-
bly be wasted. For most drugs, the regulatory review period will signifi-
cantly exceed the maximum five-year patent extension,"' so a finding that
the applicant was not diligent will rarely deprive the patentholder of any
part of the five-year extension. Even reduced by the lack of due diligence,
the review period usually will exceed five years, unless the FDA speeds its
drug approval process. The FDA criticized the due diligence concept for
precisely the reason that it will bear the burden of reviewing due diligence
and providing hearings on the due diligence determination, 83 but rarely to
any purpose. '8 4 Furthermore, both the FDA and pharmaceutical companies
will endeavor to "build a record" throughout the drug approval process,
generating useless work merely to protect each side in the event that a due
diligence petition is filed.' 85
III. IMPACT OF THE ACT ON THE MARKETING AND
USE OF GENERIC SUBSTITUTES
As discussed earlier in this paper,' 86 the potential for growth in the ge-
neric pharmaceutical industry is tremendous. The next several years will see
the market share held by patented drugs fall, and many of the drugs on
which patents have recently or will shortly expire are the market's biggest
179. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1599-1600 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(2)(B)); see also
Lawton, What Is Due Diligence?, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 371 (1985) (Act does not define
"due diligence").
180. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 201(a), 98 Stat. 1585, 1599-1600 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(d)(2)(B)).
181. Id. § 201(a), 98 Stat. at 1598 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1)).
182. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing effect of FDA review on effective
patent life).
183. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 201(a), 98 Stat. 1585, 1600 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(d)(2)(B)(ii)).
184. See 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 141, at 21 (statement of Dr. Mark A. Novitch,
Acting Comm'r, FDA).
185. See P. Miller, Impact on Innovation: Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Res-
toration Act 1984, at 6-7 (Nov. 13, 1984) (outline of comments delivered to the Food and
Drug Law Institute).
186. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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selling products. One extremely enthusiastic prediction soon after the Act
was passed foresaw consumer savings of one billion dollars in the next dec-
ade, a halving of the average price of many prescription drugs, and a doub-
ling of the generic market.' 87 This prediction seems overstated, for despite
the advances in the generic drug industry made possible by the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, substantial barriers to wide-
spread drug substitution remain.
A. Barriers to Generic Substitution
1. Brand-Name Product Advertising
As already noted, the advertising of brand-name products plays a signifi-
cant role in the maintenance of large market shares by brand-name pharma-
ceutical companies. 188 Efforts by firms to achieve brand-name recognition
cater not only to physician preferences for the best possible treatment, but
also solidify the position of brand-name drugs after patent expiration
removes the legal barrier to generic substitution. 89 Advertising can there-
fore retard entry into the market by low-priced generic substitutes because
the brand-name drug will be the product already preferred by physicians and
pharmacists, and the high cost of drug promotion will prevent generic firms
from competing in that "market for information."' 9°
Some studies have shown that brand-name drugs lose little of their market
share in the years following patent expiration. Schwartzman, for example,
found only limited competition among equivalent antibiotic drugs, but did
not study market share erosion in other therapeutic areas.19' A more exten-
sive study by Statman concluded that in the market as a whole, brand-name
drugs retained 96.1% of the drugstore market and 89% percent of the hospi-
tal market. 192 Most commentators seem to agree, however, that the Statman
study severely understates the impact of generic competition. The study
187. See Kushner, supra note 2, at 22.
188. See supra notes 37-40, 45-48, 64 and accompanying text.
189. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 34; Leffier, supra note 37,
at 47; J. Wheaton, Optimal Research Patterns: The Pharmaceutical Firm 2 (Dec. 1981) (paper
submitted to the Department of Economics, Wake Forest University); see also Statman &
Tyebjee, Trademarks, Patents, and Innovation in the Ethical Drug Industry, J. MARKETING,
Summer 1981, at 71 (brand loyalty causes continued market dominance following patent
expiration).
190. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
329 (1970) (rate of promotional expenditures to total drug industry sales is 29%); Comanor,
Research and Competitive Product Differentiation in the Pharmaceutical Industry in the United
States, 31 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 372, 380 (1964) (selling expenditures are a barrier to entry); Lef-
fler, supra note 37, at 47-48 (advertising speeds entry of new products).
191. See D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 25, at 251-99.
192. See Statman, supra note 87, at 145.
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used data that predated most of the state generic substitution laws enacted
during the 1970's.' 93 Thus, the proliferation of generic drugs in the market
during the next several years, when combined with state drug substitution
statutes, will encourage brand-name companies to find new or more aggres-
sive promotion techniques.
The increased generic competition contemplated by the Drug Price Com-
petition and Patent Term Restoration Act will spur manufacturers to inten-
sify their promotional efforts. To the extent that advertising allows higher-
price brand-name drugs to retain most of their market share after patent
expiration, brand promotion will be more aggressive during the period im-
mediately prior to patent expiration.194 The longer exclusivity period guar-
anteed to brand name drug products by the Act will also provide a longer
term during which the drug product can generate brand loyalty. 195
Antigeneric advertising is another method for maintaining brand-name
market share. 196 At present, generic companies still are unable to counter
such advertising by pointing out that their products are approved by the
FDA.' 97 FDA permission for preapproval promotion may also be sought by
brand-name manufacturers as a means to lay a market foundation for new
drugs.' 98 Although such promotion is opposed by many industry and pro-
fessional groups, 99 the FDA recently lifted its moratorium on direct-to-con-
sumer advertising, 200 which could engender patient pressure on physicians
and pharmacists to prescribe and dispense "high quality" brand-name
drugs.20 1
193. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 45 (testimony of Lewis A. Engman, Presi-
dent, PMA); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 33; Statman, supra note
87, at 166-68 (commentary of Leonard Schifrin, Professor of Economics, College of William
and Mary).
194. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 35.
195. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 44.
196. See supra notes 45-48, 64 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Pending legislation would remove this
statutory restriction. See infra note 245.
198. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Feb. 4, 1985, at 2 (commentary of Jonah Shacknai from
Pink Sheet).
199. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRESCRIPTION DRUG ADVER-
TISING TO CONSUMERS (Comm. Print 1984).
200. See FDA CONS., Dec. 1985-Jan. 1986, at 3. Direct-to-consumer advertisements must
include brief summaries of a drug's potential side effects. Id. Congressional opponents of this
form of promotion have expressed displeasure with the FDA decision to lift a moratorium in
place since 1983, and have warned the industry to proceed carefully. See PMA NEWSLETTER,
Jan. 13, 1986, at 5-6.
201. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Feb. 4, 1985, at 2 (commentary of Jonah Shacknai from
Pink Sheet). But see Masson & Rubin, Matching Prescription Drugs and Consumers. The
Benefits of Direct Advertising, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 513 (1985). Masson and Rubin assert
Catholic University Law Review
Finally, brand-name manufacturers will turn to trademark and trade dress
protection to insulate their market shares. The size, shape, and color of drug
products can be virtually as effective as patents as barriers to entry.2 ° 2 Pa-
tients identify drugs they have taken before by such characteristics, and will
be uncomfortable with receiving a "different" drug.2°3 The legal protection
of the Lanham Act will continue to permit brand-name firms to distinguish
their products by unique trade dress,2° and could help retard the trend to
generic substitution.
2. Physician and Pharmacist Behavior
All of the factors that historically have discouraged physicians and phar-
macists from generic substitution, such as product advertising, the percep-
tion that generic products often are inferior, price ignorance, and fear of
liability, 20 5 will continue even after adoption of the Act. Proposals such as
the Model Drug Product Selection Act offer some opportunity to minimize
the reluctance of physicians not to substitute by, for example, requiring pre-
scriptions to indicate that a brand-name product is medically necessary in
order to preclude substitution. 20 6 To some extent, however, the attitudes of
pharmacists and physicians always will be a limiting factor for the potential
of the generic drug industry.
3. Erosion of Product Life Due to Patent Term Extension
and Market Exclusivity
Just as brand-name manufacturers calculate the potential commercial
benefits of a new project when they make decisions to expend funds on drug
research and development, after a patent or market exclusivity period for a
pioneer drug expires, a potential generic manufacturer will weigh the cost of
market entry against the potential commercial gain during the remaining
market life of the pioneer drug. For many pioneer drugs that receive patent
extension or market exclusivity, generic competition may be so delayed that
that direct-to-consumer advertising might create positive health effects by, for example, pro-
viding information about disease symptoms, treatment, and drug side effects, as well as eco-
nomic benefits such as shifts to lower-priced brands, retail competition, and overall price level
decreases.
202. See generally BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 35-36; M.
STATMAN, supra note 25, at 63-64; Statman, supra note 87, at 143.
203. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 32; Ryan, supra note
141, at 349.
204. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); Inwood Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
205. See supra notes 37-48, 62-67, and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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the potential sales revenue of a generic product will be less than the cost of
securing FDA approval of and marketing the generic drug.2°7 This problem
can be anticipated, but its real effect on the generic market cannot be mea-
sured until the generation of products that will receive patent extensions and
market exclusivity reach the market. For some drugs there might be little or
no useful market life remaining after the exclusivity period or extension
ends.2"' In this manner, patent extension and market exclusivity periods
will act as disincentives to generic drug manufacturers.
The Act also permits brand-name manufacturers to use market exclusivity
to foreclose to generic competitors part of the market for a drug. If a drug
has multiple uses, each new use (or other improvement to the drug) is eligi-
ble for market exclusivity if approved by the FDA in a full or supplemental
NDA.20 9 The FDA is only permitted to approve ANDAs for uses that are
not protected by a patent or market exclusivity period. Thus, by delaying
improvements or the approval of new uses, the manufacturer of a pioneer
drug can prevent new market entrants from gaining approval in an ANDA
of a generic drug that can be prescribed for every approved use of the prod-
uct. 2  Despite its "equivalence" to the pioneer, proven in an ANDA, the
generic drug would not legally be available for all its potential uses. 21' The
generic product will be approved for the nonpatented uses of the pioneer, but
legally could not be prescribed for the full range of uses for which the drug is
indicated.2 12 To the extent that doctors and pharmacists find it inconvenient
to remember when the use of a generic drug is "legal," the generic product
will find limited acceptance in the market, and the pioneer's market share
will be effectively insulated.
4. Administrative Delay by the Food and Drug Administration
The effectiveness of the Act's progeneric provisions also depends on the
FDA's ability to make approval of a generic copy of a pioneer drug effective
as soon as the patent or market exclusivity protection for the pioneer expires.
In theory, the Act makes it difficult for agency delay to act as a barrier to
timely market entry: the Act's ANDA provisions, with one exception,
merely prohibit the FDA from making approved ANDAs effective before
207. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 44, 45.
208. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 82, at 7 (statement of Donna Valtri, Office of
Technology Assessment).
209. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
210. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 40, 44-45.
211. See infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
212. But see supra note 100 and accompanying text (it will be impossible to police actual
use for which generic drug is prescribed).
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the patent or exclusivity period expires. Only in the case of post-enactment
new chemical entities approved in an NDA does the Act prevent the submis-
sion of an ANDA during the period of exclusivity (in that case for five
years). For many pioneer drugs, therefore, a generic competitor may submit
an ANDA as soon as the NDA on which it relies has been approved. The
Act's reversal of Bolar permits potential competitors to conduct the bioavai-
lability and bioequivalency testing needed for the ANDA, and even if these
studies take eighteen months to two years to complete,213 the FDA should
be able to act on the ANDA before generic competition becomes legally
permissible.
The Act requires the FDA to approve or disapprove an ANDA within
180 days of its receipt. This requirement departs from the current FDA
practice of not considering an NDA "filed" until it is virtually ready for
approval.214 The FDA can only disapprove an ANDA for one of the eleven
reasons enumerated in the statute.21 The Act's nominal deadline may be
avoided, however, because the Act allows the FDA and the applicant to
agree on a deadline extension, and Congress recognized that extensions
would be necessary.216
Prior to enactment of the new law, the FDA warned that its resources
would be insufficient to process timely the volume of ANDAs it expected.
Then-Acting FDA Commissioner Novitch originally estimated that the
agency would need $2.5 million in additional funds and fifty-five to sixty new
drug reviewers 217 to cope with a backlog of ANDAs he estimated would
total 900 within six months of enactment.2"' He argued for a phase-in of the
ANDA procedure, stated plainly that the FDA would be unable to act on
ANDAs within 180 days, 219 and noted that even with adequate funding and
additional staff it would be impossible to hire enough qualified reviewers to
process ANDAs.22°
Dr. Novitch later revised his funding and staff estimates upward to $3
213. See 1981 Senate Hearing, supra note 73, at 129 (testimony of Kenneth N. Larsen,
Chairman, GPIA) (estimating such a period for biostudies).
214. See J. Hoffman, supra note 145; supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
216. See H.R. REP. No. 857, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2647, 2660.
217. See PMA NEWSLETrER, Sept. 10, 1984, at 2 (attributing statement to Senate testi-
mony by Dr. Novitch).
218. See 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 141, at 15-16 (statement of Dr. Mark A. Novitch,
Acting Comm'r, FDA).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 30 (testimony of Dr. Mark A. Novitch, Acting Comm'r, FDA).
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million and from ninety to one hundred new reviewers. 22 1 His backlog pre-
diction was borne out. Within a week of the first permissible date for
ANDA submission, 370 ANDAs had been filed, and pending paper NDAs,
which the agency planned to convert to ANDAs, 222 added 140 applications
to that total.223
The influx of ANDAs seemed likely to exacerbate the already serious
workload problems in FDA's Center for Drugs and Biologics. Previous
studies have concluded that the FDA drug review process is inefficient be-
cause of uneven workloads among reviewers, high turnover, poor-quality
personnel, and the inordinate time reviewers must devote to tasks other than
reviewing drug applications.2 24 Moreover, the FDA drug approval process
for new drugs already consumes several years on average, and a high volume
of ANDAs might not only delay the approval of generic drugs, but may
divert resources allocated to review of NDAs for pioneer drugs. 2 25 Together
with the FDA manpower shortage predicted by Dr. Novitch, the workload
created by the Act will add further delay to the new drug approval process,
and could conceivably prevent the agency from complying with the statutory
deadline for ANDAs.
In spite of initial pessimism about ANDA processing, the FDA has thus
far complied with the 180-day deadline. By December 1985, the average
ANDA processing time was only 140 days,226 an apparent result of their
consideration in a separate and fully staffed division of FDA.2 27 Neverthe-
less, there has been no comparable improvement in the time required for
new drug approval.2 28
Finally, two federal budget issues cloud the future of the ANDA and
NDA approval processes. First, President Reagan's 1986 budget proposed
that "user fees" be assessed against those who seek approval from the FDA.
The industry opposes such fees, but Gerald Mossinghoff, the new president
of PMA and until recently the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
has argued that these revenues, if collected, should be channeled back into
221. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1, 1984, at 4 ("worst case" backlog scenario was 900
ANDAs during first six months after enactment and 1200 in first year).
222. See Letter from Dr. Harry M. Meyer, Jr., Director, Center for Drugs and Biologics,
FDA (Oct. 11, 1984).
223. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Dec. 3, 1984, at 1.
224. See FDA's DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS, supra note 72, at 61-62; COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FDA DRUG APPROVAL-A LENGTHY PROCESS THAT DE-
LAYS THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT NEW DRUGS 17-20 (1980).
225. See 1984 Senate Hearing, supra note 141, at 125-26 (statement of PMA dissident com-
panies) (ANDAs will receive priority because of 180-day deadline).
226. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Jan. 13, 1986, at 2-3.
227. See id., Nov. 5, 1984, at 2; id., Sept. 9, 1985, at 2-3.
228. See id., Sept. 9, 1985, at 3.
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the drug approval process to provide funds for a more effective drug ap-
proval system.229 Although user fees would increase the cost of gaining
FDA approval,2 31 the increased financial resources available to the agency if
the fees were earmarked might provide resources sufficient to minimize FDA
delay. When they were proposed last year, the agency had no plans to chan-
nel user fees into the drug approval process. Instead, two-thirds of the funds
collected would have reverted to the general federal treasury, and the re-
maining percentage would have been used by FDA for capital
expenditures.2 31
User fees attracted considerable congressional opposition in 1985,232 and
did not appear as a feature of the Senate-approved budget.233 However, one
FDA official recently endorsed user fees as a means of expediting new drug
approval, 234 an apparent shift from the agency's position last year, and the
user fee issue will again arise during consideration of the agency's 1987
budget.2 35
Second, the restraints of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings may hamper the abil-
ity of FDA to continue to meet its time burden under the Act or to improve
its record in NDA approval. The agency must trim its budget during the
current fiscal year,236 and is likely to suffer further restrictions as Congress
continues its attempt to achieve lower budget deficits.
B. Incentives to Generic Substitution
In spite of the various disincentives to generic drug use described in the
previous section, the new Act blends well with other trends in the pharma-
ceutical market to encourage the use of generic products. For high dollar-
volume drugs the incentive to enter the generic market is very high. By mid-
1985, for example, a dozen ANDAs had been filed for generic equivalents of
Valium,23 7 a drug whose sales volume in 1983 was $225 million and whose
229. See id., Mar. 11, 1985, at 5.
230. The user fees proposed by FDA in 1985 were $126,000 for NDAs and $9900 for
ANDAs. See id., July 22, 1985, at 5.
231. See id., Apr. 8, 1985, at 1. The PMA strongly opposes this allocation of user fees. See
id., Apr. 15, 1985, at 5.
232. See id., Oct. 14, 1985, at 6.
233. See id., Oct. 21, 1985, at 5.
234. See id., Jan. 13, 1986, at 1.
235. The administration's proposed 1987 budget includes more than $25 million in user
fees. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1987, app. -KI. FDA has indicated that it would like to plough col-
lected user fees into the drug approval process. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Feb. 10, 1986, at 1.
236. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Jan. 20, 1986, at 1.
237. See id., July 8, 1985, at 5.
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compound patent expired in February 1985.238 By the end of 1985, the
FDA approved, through ANDAs, three generic versions of Valium,2 39 as
well as two generic equivalents of Inderal, a drug with an annual retail sales
volume of $400 million.24 ° The potential market for generic drugs, accord-
ing to one FDA official, could escalate from a twenty percent share of a $20
billion market in 1984 to a thirty-five percent share of $8.5 billion in pro-
jected 1990 pharmaceutical sales. 241 The Act certainly makes it easier for
generic drug companies to bring generic drug products to market, and the
continuing impact of state drug substitution laws and the pressures of medi-
cal reimbursement programs will make generic drugs more available and
give them increased market acceptance.
1. Drug Substitution Laws
Drug substitution statutes help nullify the importance of brand-name pro-
motion. As observed above, both pharmacists and physicians are reluctant
to dispense or prescribe generic drugs, 42 but these barriers are not insur-
mountable. By increasing the volume of generic products, the Act will en-
hance the acceptability of generic drugs, and the financial incentive of
pharmacists to promote generic drugs24 3 will underscore the value of con-
sumer savings. The FDA's testing and manufacturing standards should
serve as assurances that the quality of generic drugs is equivalent to that of
pioneer pharmaceutical products.2 "
Nevertheless, several legislative changes would enhance the impact of
drug substitution laws. First, drug manufacturers should be permitted to
state in advertising or labeling that a product has received FDA approval.
With proper disclaimers to avoid the appearance that the FDA is acting as a
guarantor of quality, repealing the federal statute prohibiting such labeling
or advertising245 would make generic drugs more acceptable to consumers,
238. Hollie, Generic Drugs in Bigger Role, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1984, at DI, col. 2.
239. See FDA CONS., Nov. 1985, at 3. With the approval of generic copies of Valium, nine
of the ten drugs with the highest 1984 sales volumes are now available in the form of generic
equivalents. Id.
240. See FDA CONS., Oct. 1985, at 2.
241. See Rados, Generic Drugs: Cutting Costs, Not Corners, FDA CONS., Oct. 1985, at 27.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 33-67.
243. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. A bill is pending before the current Con-
gress that would remove the statutory bar to such labeling established by 21 U.S.C. § 331(l)
(1982) and instead require labels to indicate that a drug has received FDA approval. See H.R.
2244, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H2570 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1985). The bill passed
the House last year, see 131 CONG. REC. H4760 (daily ed. June 24, 1985), and has been re-
ferred to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources. See 131 CONG. REC. S8722
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physicians, and pharmacists.
Second, state substitution laws should be rewritten to require physicians
to write a phrase such as "medically necessary" on their prescriptions if they
desire to forbid substitution. The FTC's Model Act advocates such a provi-
sion,246 which would mandate that the prescriber consciously decide against
substitution and could increase the rate of generic substitution by
pharmacists.247
Third, federal legislation should authorize a national drug formulary that
would list drug products for which substitution is permitted.248 A national
formulary would bring drug substitution into conformance with the judg-
ments of drug equivalency made by the FDA, the federal agency that deter-
mines bioavailability and bioequivalence. If created, a national formulary
should also accommodate the concern of some brand-name drug manufac-
turers that drug formularies will not account for multiple-use products that
have approved uses for which patents or market exclusivity periods are still
in effect.249
2. Medical Reimbursement Programs
Medical reimbursement programs, both public and private, can affect the
incidence of generic drug use by tailoring their maximum reimbursements
for drug costs to the prices of generic products. In state Medicaid and Medi-
care programs this form of cost control is imposed by the Maximum Allowa-
ble Cost (MAC) program, which is in place in twenty-six states.2 5° Under
the MAC program, the government establishes maximum allowable cost
levels for multisource equivalent drugs at the lowest price at which the drug
is "widely and consistently available."25' Unless a physician certifies, in his
own handwriting, that a higher-priced product is "medically necessary," the
maximum reimbursement for a prescribed drug product will be the MAC
(daily ed. June 25, 1985). The PMA opposes this legislation, claiming that such labeling would
encourage promotional excesses. PMA NEWSLETTER, July 1, 1985, at 2-3.
246. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
248. But see supra note 11 (formularies may discourage substitution). Nevertheless, even if
substitution is higher when a pharmacist is free from the formal constraint of a formulary,
formularies serve an equivalency screening function that is not accounted for by substitution
rates. See A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 98-99. Moreover, some of the disin-
centive effect associated with state positive formularies might result from delay in incorporat-
ing FDA determinations of equivalency. Id. at 71-72. If so, a national formulary coordinated
with FDA equivalency findings could function without such delay.
249. See infra note 286 and accompanying text.
250. See Prescription for Cheap Drugs, supra note 2, at 65.
251. 42 C.F.R. § 447.332 (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 19.5(c) (1985).
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price,21 2 regardless of whether the prescription is actually filled with a brand
name or generic drug. In some cases a state substitution statute may prevent
the pharmacist from substituting a generic product on a prescription written
by brand name, but the MAC regulations will still forbid full reimbursement
because the physician has failed to certify that the more expensive product is
medically necessary. The pharmacist has several options in this situation:
he can fill the prescription with the brand-name drug and lose the price dif-
ferential between the brand name price and the MAC price; refuse to fill the
prescription; call the prescribing doctor and ask for permission to substitute;
or request that the doctor make the "medically necessary" certification.253
The potential savings from MAC to federal and state government medical
entitlement programs have been estimated at twenty-four percent of the total
anticipated expenditures on multisource drug products that are potentially
subject to MAC levels.254 Most of this benefit has not yet been realized: the
current MAC regulations do not allow pharmacists to override state substi-
tution laws, and cost savings depend on the willingness of physicians to al-
low substitution.255 Moreover, the MAC program has been stalled since
1983. A task force of the Department of Health and Human Services has
been studying the program and alternative cost-control measures, and no
new MAC levels have been established.256
The benefits of programs such as MAC extend, however, beyond the sav-
ings gained in the treatment of Medicaid and Medicare recipients. Because a
MAC level is established at the "widely available" price, the price of com-
peting drugs should fall for all consumers, and not just for Medicaid and
Medicare beneficiaries. Drug companies supply pharmacists and, as such,
are incapable of practicing price discrimination among the ultimate consum-
ers of their drugs.257 A MAC limit for a drug also encourages pharmacists
to stock low-priced drugs, usually generics, with which Medicaid and Medi-
252. 42 C.F.R. § 447.332(a), (b) (1985).
253. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 135. The pharmacist
might also charge the patient the difference between the higher and lower price. See D.
SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 25, at 328. Medicaid rules may forbid this result, however. Prov-
iders of Medicaid services are required to accept Medicaid reimbursement as full payment for
their services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(c) (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 447.15 (1985).
254. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 213.
255. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 9. The Comptrol-
ler General's report, issued in 1980, also noted the failure of some states to fully comply with
federal Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) regulations.
256. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Nov. 11, 1985, at 2 (discussing possible alternatives to MAC
levels); id., July 29, 1985, at 3-4 (Department of Health and Human Services searching for less
cumbersome method of establishing reimbursement levels).
257. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 139; D. SCHWARTZMAN,
supra note 25, at 299, 329.
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care prescriptions can be filled. With these products already on their
shelves, pharmacists will become more likely to use generic products in fill-
ing non-Medicaid prescriptions." 8 The MAC program thus adds to the ac-
ceptability of generic drugs by creating a financial incentive for pharmacists
and consumers to use them and to relay price information to physicians, and
by forcing pharmacists to acclimate themselves to dispensing generic drugs.
Private medical insurance also has potential for enlarging the market
share held by generic pharmaceuticals. Some insurance companies will now
reimburse 100% of the cost of generic drugs but only 80% of the cost of
brand-name products.2 59 Private insurance reimbursement limits (such as
those relating to "diagnostic related groups," or DRGs) that establish maxi-
mum insurance reimbursement levels for particular illnesses may also en-
courage consumers to prefer generic drugs. This preference may be
translated into pressure on physicians and pharmacists to prescribe and dis-
pense generically, a consumer preference that may not be fully expressed
now. As part of the total package of health care services purchased by a
patient, prescription drug costs will represent a small proportion of total
expenditures,2 60 and patients who are publicly or privately insured have lit-
tle incentive, absent effective cost-control measures, to prefer generic
drugs.
2 61
IV. IMPACT OF THE ACT ON PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
One critic has asserted that the research-intensive segment of the pharma-
ceutical industry is the "big gainer [from the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act] because of the additional monopoly periods"
258. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 5, at 139; OFFICE OF TECHNOL-
OGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 33.
259. See Prescription for Cheap Drugs, supra note 2, at 65.
260. See A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 6. Patients are typically ignorant of
the price differential between brand-name and generic drugs, id. at 6-7, and often the pharma-
cist's decision not to substitute may reflect a consumer preference to accept the brand pre-
scribed by their physician. Id. at 46-47. This tendency is amplified by insurance for drug
costs, id. at 42, but may be overcome by cost-control programs and by statutory requirements
that pharmacists who substitute inform patients that they have done so. Such notification
provisions in state statutes serve a function similar to advertising in that they convey both
price information and the confidence of the pharmacist that generic drugs are therapeutically
equivalent to their brand-name competitors. A notification requirement will therefore increase
substitution rates. Id. at 97-98. The FTC Model Act incorporates such a provision. Model
Drug Product Selection Act, § 2(c), reprinted in BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra
note 5, at 279.
261. See A. MASSON & R. STEINER, supra note 10, at 56 (substitution rate highest for
prescriptions filled under MAC program, and lowest for patients whose drug costs were reim-
bursed by private insurance).
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created by the Act's patent extension and market exclusivity provisions.
2 62
The Act certainly assumes that greater returns to pharmaceutical innovation
will result from longer effective patent life and the financial incentives of
market exclusivity, but it is not clear that the Act's effects are one-sided.
Enhanced generic competition will erode market gains now realized by the
research-intensive industry, and in some areas, such as innovation in the
form of new uses for and improvements to existing drugs, the Act may so
dissipate anticipated returns that this source of therapeutic improvements
will dry up.
A. Averting Losses from Competition
The thesis underlying the compromise wedding between provisions that
stimulate generic drugs and those guaranteeing market protection to innova-
tive manufacturers was that increased generic competition without added
market exclusivity for brand-name products would further dampen pharma-
ceutical research and development. The danger of generic competition, as
encouraged by the Act, is that any disincentives to innovation that result
from short-term falling revenues will not be manifested in decreased drug
development until the point in the future where research decisions made now
would begin to yield therapeutic gains.2 63 The important question that a
long-term view of the Act will answer, then, is whether the incentives it
provides to innovation will at least balance out the disincentives implicit in
increased price competition.
Although the expectations of long-term gains are the immediate incentives
to innovation furthered by the Act,2" any stimulus to research caused by
these future returns should not be delayed until those gains are realized and
used to finance future innovation expenditures. The expectation is immedi-
ate, and could affect current decisions that reflect expected returns.2 65 Even
if the actual future profits are not themselves earmarked for future innova-
tion projects, but are dispersed to stockholders,2 66 a firm's decision to pursue
a particular research project necessarily will consider future monetary re-
turns, and research will be more likely to be pursued under a regulatory
regime that guarantees innovators extended periods of exclusive marketing
262. See M. Bass, supra note 4.
263. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 36.
264. See id. at 37.
265. See S. REP. No. 138, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1981) (letter of June 5, 1981 from
Morton A. Myers, Director, General Accounting Office).
266. See The Push To Protect Patents on Drugs, 222 Sci. 593, 593 (1983) (attributing this
argument to critics of patent term extension).
Catholic University Law Review
power.267
Increased drug substitution will offset some of the research and develop-
ment gains. Substitution will be decreased somewhat when longer effective
patent life discourages market entry by generic competitors,268 but, on the
other hand, programs such as MAC may drive drug prices (and through low
prices returns to investment) so low on some multiple-source products that
some innovation will be stymied. 69 Increased price competition will also
force brand-name manufacturers to cut their variable production costs; price
competition will, in some cases, create disincentives to manufacturing high-
quality drugs and, in others, discourage brand-name manufacturers from
making expenditures to develop improvements on existing drug products.27 °
A cost of the Act's market exclusivity provisions, in comparison, is the
loss experienced by consumers from the higher prices charged by brand-
name manufacturers during the longer periods of market exclusivity.
Although some argued that these consumer losses would be smaller than the
271soninoobinnovation benefits created by patent extension, this conclusion is not ob
vious. Despite the economic thesis that anticipated competition will, near
patent expiration, drive a drug's price to near its marginal variable cost,
272
the opposite effect may occur: as patent expiration nears, the manufacturer
of a pioneer drug may raise the drug's price in order to capture the full gains
available in the remaining period of monopoly.2 73
Proponents of patent restoration contended, however, that longer periods
of market exclusivity would actually lower the price of a pioneer drug over
267. In fact, comparative static results indicate that an increase in effective patent life will
not only increase the absolute amount of research and development expenditures, but also
accelerate the research and development spending pattern so that innovative drugs reach the
market more quickly. See J. Wheaton, supra note 189, at 18. This result follows easily from
the inference that although compressing total research costs into a shorter time increases the
present value of those expenditures, the gains from marketing a new drug are also greater if the
drug enters the market sooner, rather than later.
268. See H. Grabowski & J. Vernon, supra note 76, at 150-51; supra notes 207-08 and
accompanying text.
269. See C. BEZOLD, THE FUTURE OF PHARMACEUTICALS 88 (1981); D. SCHWARTZMAN,
supra note 25, at 329.
270. See D. SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 25, at 331; Leffler, supra note 37, at 66 n.57.
271. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 190-91 (statement of Dr. Lewis H. Sarett,
Senior Vice President, Merck & Co.) (research and development benefit to consumers exceeds
increased drug costs); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 41 (generic
competition hurts manufacturers of pioneer drugs more than it helps consumers).
272. See J. EGAN, H. HIGINBOTHAM & J. WESTON, supra note 25, at 48.
273. See Waldholz, supra note 44, at 8, col. 4. Of course, this tactic would have little
success if consumers of drug products chose to forgo treatment, but the demand for patented
prescription drugs is likely to be inelastic. Not only is a patient unlikely to refuse treatment
because of marginal price increases, but the availability of private and public medical reim-
bursement programs will leave patients with little incentive to economize in drug expenditures.
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the period of its exclusive marketing life. First, they argued, patent exten-
sion allows manufacturers a longer time during which the costs of research
and development may be recouped, and permits them to establish lower
price levels during the period of the patent.274 Second, assuming patent res-
toration stimulates innovation, many of the newly innovated drugs will com-
pete with drug therapies already on the market. Competition among
therapeutic alternatives will exert downward pressure on drug prices, result-
ing in a lower overall price level in the pharmaceutical market.275
Both of these suggested benefits have been disputed by opponents of pat-
ent extension. If brand-name companies retain a monopoly in a product,
they have no incentive to lower prices merely because they are capable of
spreading prior costs over a longer period.2 76 Moreover, even if future com-
petition might lower overall drug prices, that effect will appear only in the
long run and might not outweigh the consumer losses occasioned by patent
extension.277
Thus, patent extension and market exclusivity may be costly to consum-
ers, but real increases in future drug innovation may not follow. New mar-
ket monopoly periods create general incentives to research and development,
but as the following sections indicate, the Act may actually discourage par-
ticularly valuable forms of research.
B. Lost Improvements in Drug Therapy Due to New Uses
Not all drug innovation takes the form of the discovery of new chemical
entities; many therapeutic advances result from new uses of already-ap-
proved drug compounds or new dosage forms for existing drugs. As long as
a pioneer drug manufacturer retains an incentive to improve its product by
developing new uses and methods of delivery, patent term extension may
encourage research into such improvements. 278 The three-year market ex-
clusivity period guaranteed for new uses and dosage forms approved in full
or supplemental NDAs provides an incentive to innovation in cases where
the improvement is unpatentable;2 79 use and process patents can give even
274. See 1981 Senate Hearing, supra note 73, at 40-41 (testimony of Dr. Edwin H. Clark,
II, Acting Assistant Adminstrator, EPA); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note
62, at 40.
275. See 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 40 (testimony of Lewis A. Engman, Presi-
dent, PMA); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 44.
276. See 1981 House Hearings, supra note 45, at 58-59 (colloquy between Rep. Kas-
tenmeier and Dr. John Andelin, Assistant Director, Office of Technology Assessment).
277. See 1981 Senate Hearing, supra note 73, at 125-26 (testimony of William F. Haddad,
GPIA).
278. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 41.
279. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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greater market exclusivity to drug improvements.2 8 °
To some extent, the Act continues to protect innovative improvements on
old drugs. Even when an ANDA is made effective by the FDA for uses of
the pioneer drug that are no longer protected by a patent or market exclusiv-
ity period, an ANDA can never be made effective for protected uses of the
drug; the manufacturer that holds the use patent or grant of exclusivity will
have legal claim to an exclusive market for some uses of the drug com-
pound.28 ' The generic drug would be approved only for some indications,
but could not legally be promoted for the still-protected uses of the pioneer
drug.2
82
Nevertheless, if a generic equivalent is available for a pioneer drug that
retains legally protected uses, the pioneer's exclusive right to be the sole
product prescribed and dispensed for some uses will be eroded. First, en-
forcement of use patents, and by analogy, enforcement of the new market
exclusivity periods provided for in the Act, is virtually impossible. The ge-
neric manufacturer does not infringe the use patent unless it induces the
prescriber or consumer, who are the actual infringers, to violate the use pat-
ent.28" Because the generic manufacturer has the right to make the generic
drug for some uses, the brand-name firm cannot restrict market access to the
substitute product.284 Yet a suit against each infringing pharmacist or con-
sumer 28. is impractical: both the information costs and the expense involved
in litigating against single violators would outweigh potential recoveries for
infringement.
Medical reimbursement programs and state formularies might also work
to disadvantage pioneer drugs with protected uses. Drug formularies are
unlikely to specify the uses for which a generic product is equivalent to the
brand-name pioneer,2 86 and pharmacists and physicians possess no incen-
280. See 1982 House Hearing, supra note 82, at 163-64 (statement of Peter B. Hutt, on
behalf of PMA).
281. See Hutt, supra note 145, at 8; see also 1983 House Drug Legislation Hearings, supra
note 87, at 116 (statement of PMA) (this difference between the pioneer and generic drugs is
an incentive to research and development for product improvements).
282. See 1983 House Drug Legislation Hearings, supra note 87, at 141-42 (statement of
PMA); P. Miller, supra note 185, at 9-10.
283. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 52.
284. The inability of a drug manufacturer to restrict the use to which its product is put has
non-innovation implications as well. In one case involving DES, for example, a DES producer
that never sought approval or marketed its product for the prevention of miscarriages was held
to have nevertheless received financial benefits from the use of DES in problem pregnancies,
and was held liable under a concert of action/enterprise liability theory. See Miles Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 587, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1982).
285. This would appear to be the only remedy available to the pioneer manufacturer. See
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 8.
286. See P. Miller, supra note 185, at 9-10. Formularies are, in general, either positive
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tive, absent a real threat of liability for infringment, to educate themselves on
the legal substitutability of equivalent products.287 Hospital DRGs will not
account for the higher cost of a superior, but newly innovated, dosage
form.2 88 The Medicaid MAC program sets price levels for multisource
products, but presently does not make clear that a product could be mul-
tisource for one use but single source for another use or dosage form.289 In
any event, it would be impossible for a manufacturer subject to price compe-
tition to practice price discrimination among those who consume its product
for distinct uses.
The ability of a generic manufacturer to secure an ANDA for some subset
of a drug's uses thus discourages innovation into potential new uses. How-
ever, the availability of multiple uses provides other, sometimes perverse,
incentives. Generic products provide price competition, but to the extent
that a new use or dosage form allows the innovator to price its product at a
higher than competitive level, new uses and dosage forms act as therapeutic
competition 29° that could allow the pioneer manufacturer to keep its market
share.
The structure of the exclusivity provisions in the Act, as well as the poten-
tial extension of a product patent, encourage innovating firms to delay im-
provements on pioneer drugs until shortly before the compound patent
expires. The extension of the compound patent will already have lengthened
the exclusive marketing time for the pioneer drug, and by introducing an
improvement that will itself receive exclusivity, the innovating firm protects
its market position. These firms, in contrast to generic competitors, will be
able to advertise to physicians and pharmacists that their product is the only
(listing drugs that are interchangeable), or negative (listing those that are not equivalent). See
supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra
note 5, at 157-58; Goldberg, Aldridge, DeVito, Vidis, Moore & Dickson, supra note 17, at 216.
An FDA official has indicated that it will indeed be difficult to control the manner in which
the equivalent products are dispensed, but that the design of formularies to accommodate this
concern will have to be resolved at the state level. F-D-C REPORTS, Jan. 28, 1985, at 6.
287. But as may be the case for physicians, the prescription (or dispensing) of a product for
a nonapproved use might be the basis for a malpractice claim. See Wardell, The Impact of
Regulation on New Drug Development, in ISSUES IN PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS, supra
note 74, at 145-147. This concern has already been expressed by California pharmacists, who
inquired of Rep. Waxman whether they might be subject to malpractice liability if they substi-
tuted a generic equivalent of a brand name drug for an indication protected by an exclusivity
period. Waxman expressed his opinion that the matter should be clarified, but that a malprac-
tice claim could not arise out of such a substitution as long as the substituted product was
equivalent to the brand-name product. See PMA NEWSLETTER, Dec. 23, 1985, at 5-6.
288. See P. Miller, supra note 185, at 10.
289. Id. at 11-12.
290. Cf 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 49, at 56 (statement of Lewis A. Engman, Presi-
dent, PMA).
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one available for a full range of uses. If state formularies and medical reim-
bursement programs are reworked, as suggested above, to protect exclusive
marketing rights for new uses, the pharmacist and physician will be disin-
clined to remember whether a particular generic product can be prescribed
or dispensed for a particular use, and will tend to prescribe and dispense the
pioneer brand-name product.
C. The Disincentive Created by the Statutory Reversal of Roche v. Bolar
Finally, the statutory reversal of Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceu-
tical Co.29' is so broad that research-intensive firms will lose much of their
incentive to test for new uses of existing drug products. The Act permits the
use of a patented product to conduct any tests required for the submission of
information under any federal law that regulates the manufacture, sale, or
use of drugs.292 By the statute's terms, any person can use a patented drug
to conduct any of the tests required for FDA approval of a drug product.
The Bolar reversal applies not only to ANDAs, then, but also to any uses
related to the submisson of a full or supplemental NDA on a new drug use,
new dosage form, or combination drug product that could not be formulated
without the pioneer compound.
Traditionally, only the holder of a patent on a pioneer drug could develop
and gain approval of improvements upon the pioneer drug during the life of
the patent, and under the result of Bolar, a use of the patented drug to ex-
ploit a commercial gain would have infringed the original patent. After the
reversal of Bolar, however, any potential competitor can secure approval of
an ANDA or NDA without infringing the compound patent. Because even
basic testing of a drug is required for FDA approval,293 competition for the
discovery of drug improvements is now open to all potential competitors.
Although the Bolar reversal provision permits testing and submission of
test data, it will not allow the competitor to market a drug that contains the
patented product during the legal exclusivity period. The competitor would
therefore be allowed to submit to FDA testing, but would probably infringe
the patent if it allowed an NDA to become effective during the life of the
patent. This scenario, which is plausible under the statute, presents an inter-
esting problem for drug innovators. The pioneer manufacturer's previously
exclusive right to file NDAs for improvements on the pioneer drug may be
291. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 183 (1984).
292. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 261(j)(4)(D)(i)); id. § 103, 98 Stat. at 1595 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1)).
293. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 62, at 14-15 (preclinical
animal tests, IND and NDA safety and efficacy studies, and long-term animal toxicity testing
all required); 21 C.F.R. §§ 310, 312, 314 (1985) (FDA drug approval requirements).
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usurped, but it is possible for the first-filed NDA not to be the first NDA
approved because the competitor cannot market an NDA-approved product
until the pioneer's patent expires. Nevertheless, the competitor, by filing its
NDA, can foreclose the pioneer's manufacturer from receiving any patent
protection for the drug improvement. The submission of the improvement
idea to clinical testing will make that use of the product public, and should
suffice to prevent another party, in this example, the original patentholder,
from being granted a patent on the improvement. 94
Nor could the competitor file for a patent: the Bolar reversal provision
does not avoid the act of infringement that would result from the use of a
patented product for the purpose of completing a patent application. Never-
theless, the competitor will face no barrier to market entry once the original
compound patent on the drug expires. The market exclusivity periods
granted by the Act, which begin to run on the date the first NDA for a new
drug or drug improvement is approved, provide no protection in this case to
the holder of the compound patent. Even if the patent owner is the first to
obtain an approved NDA for a drug improvement, a competing firm may file
an NDA on the same improvement (and may even have filed first) without
infringing the compound patent. The original patent will be infringed only if
the NDA is made effective prior to the patent's expiration. As soon as the
patent expires, the competitor is free to market its version of the drug. Thus,
the patentholder may win the race to start the exclusivity period, but cannot
prevent a competitor who files an NDA for the same improvement from
competing during the post-patent exclusivity period.
The patentholder, and its competitors who file NDAs, will retain market
exclusivity as against other competitors who do not receive approval for
their product in a new or supplemental NDA, but the incentive to pursue
pharmaceutical innovations obtainable by testing existing drugs will be
greatly diminished. In effect, the Act's reversal of Bolar introduces a risk
that the holder of a compound patent will be prevented from receiving addi-
tional patents for otherwise patentable improvements.
Even worse for the patentholder, however, is the prospect that a competi-
tor might obtain an exclusive marketing period based on an improvement to
294. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (applicant not entitled to patent if invention known or
used by others in the United States before its invention by applicant); id. § 102(b) (applicant
not entitled to patent if invention described in published material or subjected to public use
more than one year before application filed); Kitch, The Patent System and the New Drug
Application: An Evaluation of the Incentives for Private Investment in New Drug Research and
Marketing, in REGULATING NEW DRUGS, supra note 75, at 81, 85 (submission for clinical
testing will activate public use within meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982)).
Catholic University Law Review
the patentholder's product.29 5 Because the FDA accords trade secret status
to the existence of an NDA file unless the existence of the file has been ac-
knowledged or disclosed by the applicant, 296 a potential competitor can file
an NDA for an improvement without the patentholder's knowledge. The
Act gives notice to patentholders when ANDAs are filed, but makes no such
provision for NDAs, and thereby avoid alerting the patentholder that a ther-
apeutic improvement of its product is nearing approval. Once the com-
pound patent expires, the competitor can allow an NDA to be approved, and
will be entitled to the market exclusivity periods authorized for drug innova-
tions by the Act. Any other competitor, including the original patentholder,
might avoid exclusion from the market by securing approval of the same
improvement through an NDA, but would probably not complete required
testing until after the new product has enjoyed significant exclusive market-
ing for the new use or product.
This application of the Bolar reversal provision inverts the incentive to
innovate that now exists. Before the Act, the holder of a drug's compound
patent could gain a post-patent marketing advantage by making its product
more attractive than generic equivalents. If its improved drug product were
therapeutically superior to generic alternatives, or if generic drugs could not
be prescribed for the full range of uses of the drug, the brand-name product
could expect to retain much of its market share even if it priced its product
above a "competitive" level.297 After the Act, however, both patentholders
and potential competitors are free to work on improvements to patented
products. Each will also suffer the uncertainty that it has not been the first
to discover an improvement, or that it will not be the first to bring the new
product to market. Neither patentholders nor their competitors, therefore,
possess a clear incentive under the Act to invest in research to discover im-
provements on old drugs.
V. CONCLUSION
In spite of the broad claims made for the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act by its supporters, the new law is not an obvi-
ous cure-all for the separate problems faced by patients, generic drug compa-
295. NAPM general counsel Milton Bass theorized that the Act's exclusivity periods could
encourage a new class of pharmaceutical firms-"brandgen companies"-that will develop the
ability to research and market new dosage forms and delivery systems. F-D-C REPORTS, Jan.
28, 1985, at 7-8.
296. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.430 (1985) ("FDA will not publicly disclose application before an
approvable letter is sent to the applicant under § 314.110, unless the existence of the applica-
tion has been previously publicly disclosed or acknowledged.").
297. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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nies, and brand-name drug firms. A simplified approval process for generic
drugs may make entry into the "generic market" more attractive, but barri-
ers to generic drug substitution remain. Brand-name drug companies will
continue to protect their market share through advertising, and pharmacists
and physicians, who are the targets of such promotion, choose whether a
brand-name or generic drug will be dispensed to fill a prescription. Ex-
tended market exclusivity for brand-name products will also make entry into
some markets less attractive if the brand-name drug's market share is rein-
forced or if the product has a limited useful commercial life after the expira-
tion of the brand-name drug's market exclusivity period. Moreover, even if
the ANDA provisions of the Act cause an explosion in the generic drug
market, the FDA may not possess resources adequate to process generic
drug applications as quickly as the Act contemplates.
Likewise, the patent extensions and market exclusivity periods provided
for by the Act are designed to give financial incentives to pharmaceutical
research and development, but heightened generic competition may offset
the monetary gains that accrue from exclusive marketing rights. Some pro-
visions of the Act actually contradict the goal of increased research and de-
velopment by creating disincentives to the discovery of new uses and dosage
forms for already-approved drugs.
This article has suggested several initiatives that seem necessary to allow
the Act to realize the results promised for it. Generic drug substitution will
have greater impact in the pharmaceutical market if physicians are required
to handwrite antisubstitution instructions and thus decide consciously
whether substitution is truly inappropriate. A national drug formulary and
enactment of a pending statutory amendment permitting manufacturers of
approved drugs to advertise that their products have received FDA approval
would make generic drugs more acceptable to pharmacists and physicians.
Formularies should distinguish, however, products for which some uses have
exclusive marketing life from those that have only limited application.
Finally, the new Act should be amended to limit the impact of the Bolar
reversal provision. When enacted, its sponsors intended merely to permit
potential generic competitors to conduct the bioequivalency and bioavai-
lability tests required for approval of an ANDA. As written however, the
statute discourages innovation into new uses and variations of already-ap-
proved drug products.

